Rapid organizational change is increasing the pressure on employees to continually update their skills and adapt their behavior to new organizational realities. Goal orientation is a promising motivational construct that may explain why some individuals adapt to change better. Unfortunately, the current goal orientation literature is in a state of conceptual and methodological disarray. This presentation reviews the goal orientation literature and identifies numerous conceptual ambiguities, including definitional inconsistencies, dimensional inconsistencies, and inconsistencies in the conceptualization of stability. These conceptual ambiguities result in a confusing array of goal orientation measures and manipulations and ultimately an incoherent empirical database. A dynamic self-regulation model of goal orientation, termed motivated action theory, is presented to integrate the various conceptual perspectives and to provide guidelines for future goal orientation research.
The nature of work in organizations is rapidly changing. Teambased work structures are now the norm in many industries as organizations grapple with the increasing complexity and information demands of modern work. The concept of "going to the office" is becoming less relevant as organizations transition from permanently assigned office space for each person to various models of flexible, shared workspace (e.g., Wallace, 2000) . As communication technology improves, the trend toward geographically distributed systems to accomplish work is rapidly increasing. In fact, many organizational employees now accomplish a majority of their work responsibilities at home through telework systems (O'Mahony & Barley, 1999) . Similarly, team members are often not in the same geographic location even during team meetings, and distributed, temporary project teams are rapidly becoming the norm in organizations (Devine, Clayton, Philips, Dunford, & Melner, 1999) . Jobs are becoming more cognitively complex and require increased levels of coordination and communication among employees (Appelbaum & Berg, 1999; Tannenbaum, Beard, & Salas, 1992) .
The rapid pace of organizational change places increased pressure on employees to continually update their skills and adapt their behavior to new organizational realities. This challenge raises a number of important questions concerning organizational behavior. Why do some individuals display remarkable plasticity in their behavioral responses to changes in the organization, whereas others steadfastly resist change or experience great stress when faced with the need to alter behavior? Why do some individuals continually strive to improve themselves over their life span, whereas others are content to forge through life using the same basic knowledge and skills? Why are some individuals able to overcome damaging behaviors that may affect their work and work relations such as smoking, overeating, alcoholism, and gambling, whereas others repeatedly succumb to damaging behavior? Why do some individuals throw themselves wholeheartedly into challenging tasks, whereas others avoid challenging tasks or engage in selfhandicapping activities?
The construct of goal orientation provides at least a partial answer to these questions. Although originally developed in the educational psychology literature to explain differences in student learning behavior (e.g., C. I. Diener & Dweck, 1978 Dweck, 1975; Dweck & Reppucci, 1973) , goal orientation has become one of the most frequently studied motivational variables in applied psychology and is currently the dominant approach in the study of achievement motivation. Since its introduction to the field (e.g., Farr, Hofmann, & Ringenbach, 1993; Kanfer, 1990) , goal orientation has been used to understand and predict learning and adaptive behavior in a wide variety of contexts, including training (Brown, 2001; Cannon-Bowers, Rhodenizer, Salas, & Bowers, 1998; Fisher & Ford, 1998; Ford, Smith, Weissbein, Gully, & Salas, 1998; Stevens & Gist, 1997) , sales performance (VandeWalle, Brown, Cron, & Slocum, 1999) , feedback seeking (VandeWalle & Cummings, 1997; VandeWalle, Ganesan, Challagalla, & Brown, 2000) , goal setting (Phillips & Gully, 1997) , and performance adaptability (Kozlowski et al., 2001) . present in the goal orientation literature have resulted in a large number of inconsistent empirical results that are difficult to reconcile. Furthermore, as goal orientation has moved beyond its original focus on student achievement in the classroom, a number of methodological and conceptual ambiguities have developed (Button, Matheiu, & Zajac, 1996; Phillips & Gully, 1997) . Given the conceptual confusion that currently exists, it is not surprising that the relationship between goal orientation and important outcomes such as learning and performance is unclear. In fact, research results support a variety of conflicting relationships among goal orientation, learning, adaptation, and performance. Even the widely held belief that mastery orientation results in adaptive behavior and performance orientation results in maladaptive behavior is no longer supportable (e.g., Harackiewicz & Elliot, 1998; Urdan, 1997) .
The purpose of this study is to first identify the conceptual and methodological inconsistencies in the goal orientation literature. We then propose a theoretical framework to resolve the identified conceptual and methodological inconsistencies. In this review, we focused on adult goal orientation processes relevant to the work setting. We began our literature search with the articles used in Button et al.'s (1996) review of the goal orientation literature. We then conducted a search of the PsycINFO database from 1995 to June 2005 for articles containing any of the following keywords: achievement motivation, achievement goals, goal orientation, mastery orientation, learning orientation, performance orientation, mastery goals, learning goals, and performance goals. Given our focus, we excluded research examining the role of goal orientation in the context of health, kinesiology, leisure studies, and child education. This restricted search identified the 88 published empirical studies (Table 1) . We examined each of these studies and identified the major differences in conceptual and operational treatments of goal orientation that we next present.
Conceptual Inconsistencies Definition
The first conceptual inconsistency involves differences in the definition of goal orientation. As Pintrich (2000a) and Elliot and Thrash (2001) highlighted, there is no common definition of goal orientation, and researchers refer to very different processes by the same name. To capture the extent of this problem, we examined the definitional approaches present in the empirical goal orientation literature and identified five distinct categories of definitions: goals, traits, quasi-traits, mental frameworks, and beliefs. The results of this coding process are presented in Table 1 . Representative examples of each definitional approach are presented in Table 2 .
The classifications capture the main themes present in authors' descriptions of goal orientation. However, as with any classification system, judgment is required when placing definitions into the respective categories. When the authors' description did not clearly fit into one of the categories, we categorized it as "other" (2.3% of studies) for coding purposes. Other authors provided descriptions that overlapped the different categories. For instance, Brett and Atwater (2001) and Yeo and Neal (2004) first describe goal orientation as a mental framework (our fourth definition category) but later focus on the dispositional aspects of goal orientation (our second definition category). When authors' descriptions overlapped our categories, we placed the definition in the category that we felt best represented the authors' perspective of goal orientation. Three studies (3.4%) did not provide sufficient detail to determine the adopted definitional approach.
Goals. The most common definitional approach present in the empirical literature (k ϭ 29; 33% of studies) views goal orientation as the adoption and pursuit of specific goals in achievement contexts (e.g., Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001; Elliot, 1999; Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996; Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997; Elliot & Thrash, 2001; Grant & Dweck, 2003) . For research studies to be placed in this category, the authors needed to explicitly refer to goal orientation as the pursuit of specific achievement goals. Research based on this approach to goal orientation is dominated by the work of Elliot and Harackiewicz (see Table 2 for representative examples of this approach).
Within this category, the number of achievement goals and the reasons for adopting specific achievement goals vary across authors. Performance and mastery goals are, by far, the most frequently discussed goals in this definitional approach. However, Elliot and colleagues frequently subdivide performance goals into performance-approach and performance-avoid goals, and Elliot and McGregor (2001) further subdivide mastery goals into mastery-approach and mastery-avoid goals. The reason why an individual adopts one of these goals over the other possible achievement goals is often not well specified. Elliot and his colleagues typically view goal adoption as reflecting an individual's construal of competence. If individuals seek to develop or improve competence, they are likely to adopt a mastery goal. If, alternatively, they seek to demonstrate competence to others, then they are likely to adopt a performance goal. The most common competing explanation for achievement goal adoption is that the construal of self-worth, rather than competence, is the primary determinant of goal adoption (e.g., A. J. Martin, Marsh, & Debus, 2001) .
Traits. In the second most common definitional approach (k ϭ 26; 29.5%), authors view goal orientation as a trait or disposition that is responsible for individual differences in behavior. Studies were placed in this category if they explicitly referred to goal orientation as a disposition (e.g., VandeWalle, 1997; VandeWalle et al., 2000) , a personality variable (e.g., VandeWalle, Cron, & Slocum, 2001 ), a trait (e.g., Bell & Kozlowski, 2002; Phillips & Gully, 1997) , an individual difference (Holladay & Quiñones, 2003) , or a stable dispositional trait (Towler & Dipboye, 2001) . A number of studies placed in this category did not explicitly define goal orientation as a trait or personality variable but rather referred to types of individuals who possess a particular goal orientation (e.g., mastery-oriented individuals) and made no mention of situational impacts on this orientation or of flexibility in adopting various orientations across time or situations (e.g., Bembenutty, 1999; Madzar, 2001; Wolters, 2003) .
As can be seen in Table 2 , goal orientation is described as an individual difference variable most similar to a facet of personality. As with most trait approaches, little effort is directed at specifying the causes of the trait or the developmental trajectories of the trait. Goal orientation is viewed as being part of the general personality of the person that is manifested by behavioral patterns Indicates that the study used a median or mean split to form goal orientation groups from a continuous measure.
* Indicates that the study used a median or mean split to form goal orientation groups from a continuous measure. Elliot & Harackiewicz (1994) Achievement theorists have differentiated two types of general achievement goals that characterize an individual's purpose for task engagement: performance achievement goals, which focus on the demonstration of ability and define competence normatively, and mastery achievement goals, which focus on the development of skills and abilities and define competence self-referentially (Ames & Archer, 1987; Dweck, 1986) . Harackiewicz et al. (2002) More recently, theorists have focused on achievement goals, conceptualized as situationally specific measures of motivational orientation, and argued that they may be stronger predictors of academic success (Pintrich & Schunk, 1996) . Achievement goals reflect the purpose of achievement behavior in a particular setting (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Nicholls, 1984) . When pursuing mastery goals in a learning situation, a student's purpose is to develop competence by acquiring new knowledge and skills. When pursuing performance goals, a student's purpose is to demonstrate competence relative to others. Not all students are positively oriented toward competence, however, and some adopt work avoidance goals that focus on effort minimization (Brophy, 1983; Nicholls, 1989) . Karabenick & Collins-Eaglin (1997) Achievement goals (or goal orientations) refer to the motivational basis of learning (i.e., the purpose for which learning is undertaken).
Disposition/trait (24.3%) Bell & Kozlowski (2002) "Goal orientation is a construct originating in the educational literature that suggests that individuals hold either a learning or performance orientation toward tasks (e.g., Dweck, 1986 Dweck, , 1989 Towler & Dipboye (2001) Goal orientation has been identified as a stable dispositional trait that can moderate the effects of training (e.g., Button et al., 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) . VandeWalle (1997) Dweck (1986) proposed that individuals have goal orientations: dispositions toward developing or demonstrating ability in achievement situations.
Quasi-trait (13.5%) Button, Mathieu, & Zajac (1996) We believe that goal orientation is best characterized as a somewhat stable individual difference variable that may be influenced by situational characteristics. Thus, dispositional goal orientations will predispose individuals to adopt a particular response patterns across situations, but situational characteristics may cause them to adopt a different or less acute response pattern for a particular situation. Hofmann & Strickland (1995) Nicholls and others have discussed the notion that individuals may have underlying tendencies to be either task or ego oriented. In other words, in the absence of a strong situation cue, individuals will adopt a "default" achievement goal. Mangos & Steele-Johnson (2001) Researchers have characterized goal orientation as a somewhat stable individual difference factor that can be changed by situational characteristics (Button, Mathieu, & Zajac, 1986; Dweck, 1989; Farr, Hofmann, & Ringenbach, 1993) .
Mental Framework (10.8%) Ames & Archer (1987) Achievement goals are thus viewed as an a priori framework for how individuals construe achievement situations as well as how they interpret, evaluate, and act on achievement information (cf. Dweck, 1984) . Lee, Sheldon, & Turban (2003) Achievement goal patterns, sometimes referred to as goal orientation, refer to how individuals perceive and respond to achievement situations (Dweck & Leggett, 1988) . We theorize that the global personality traits outlined by selfdetermination theory will predict these domain-specific achievement goal patterns. Strage (1997) Mastery versus learned-helplessness orientation. This pair of constructs from the achievement motivation literature reflects two constellations of achievement-related attitudes and behaviors that learners have been shown to display. Mastery-oriented learners tend to adopt learning goals. Learners who adopt a learned-helplessness orientation tend to adopt performance goals.
Beliefs (8.1%)
Franken & Brown (1995) In general, the research indicates that people who believe that intelligence can be acquired tend to adopt a mastery orientation, whereas people who believe that intelligence is fixed tend to adopt a performance orientation. According to the distinction made by Dweck (1991) , performance types are more concerned with pleasing others, whereas mastery types are concerned with developing competence. Hertenstein (2001) First identified in school-age children by Dweck and her colleagues, goal orientation refers to an individual's belief in the malleability of ability. Wood & Bandura (1989) Research has identified two major conceptions of ability to which people subscribe (M. Bandura & Dweck, 1987; Dweck & Elliot, 1983; Nicholls, 1984) . In one perspective, they construe ability as an incremental skill that can be continually enhanced by acquiring knowledge and perfecting one's competencies. People with this conception adopt a learning goal. In the contrasting perspective, ability is construed as a more or less fixed entity. This type of conception of ability heightens evaluative concerns about personal competence that can have diverse effects on cognitive functioning (Nicholls, 1984) . Because performance level is regarded as diagnostic of intellectual capacity, errors and deficient performance carry personal and social evaluative threats. Therefore, people adopting the entity view tend to pursue performance goals of demonstrating their competence.
that occur in achievement contexts. It is somewhat ironic that many of the studies in this category cite Dweck and her colleagues (e.g., Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) to support the trait approach even though Dweck has explicitly voiced concerns about the ability of the trait perspective "to capture parsimoniously the dynamic, process-oriented nature of personality" (Dweck, 1996, p. 348) . Quasi-trait. The third common definitional approach (k ϭ 9; 10.2%) is to view goal orientation as a somewhat stable trait that can be modified by appropriate situational characteristics (e.g., Button et al., 1996; Mangos & Steele-Johnson, 2001 ). As in the case of trait definitions, studies were placed into this category if they either explicitly referred to goal orientation as a quasi-trait or as a somewhat stable disposition or referred to types of individuals (e.g., mastery-oriented individuals) and explicitly highlighted the situational malleability of the individual's goal orientation.
As can be seen in Table 2 , this definitional approach either explicitly or implicitly incorporates the concept of situational strength. In weak situations in which few cues are present to guide behavior, the individual is predisposed to adopt a particular orientation to achievement tasks. Conversely, in strong situations, many cues exist that suggest appropriate behaviors, and in this case the situational cues may override the individual's natural predispositions to a particular goal orientation. The situational features and the required strength or salience of the situational features that are likely to modify the adoption of an orientation remain unspecified. The near-uniform practice adopted in the quasi-trait approach is to briefly concede cross-situational variability in goal orientation and then refer to goal orientation as a trait (e.g., Roberson & Alsua, 2002) , an individual difference (e.g., Kozlowski et al., 2001; Mangos & Steele-Johnson, 2001 ), or a personality variable (e.g., Colquitt & Simmering, 1998) .
Mental framework. The fourth common approach (k ϭ 9; 10.2%) is to define goal orientation as a mental framework consisting of a wide variety of beliefs, affects, goals, and cognitions that covary in achievement contexts and result in achievement related behavior. The representative examples of this definitional approach in Table 2 highlight that there is very little focus on the process of goal orientation, and instead the term goal orientation is used as a catchall phrase to describe global patterns of how individuals perceive and respond to achievement situations. It sometimes appears that there is a process model specified in definitions of this type, but on further analysis the detailed process is often poorly specified or even circular. For instance, the definition provided by Strage (1997) in Table 2 suggests that masteryoriented learners tend to adopt mastery goals. However, a masteryoriented learner refers to an unspecified constellation of achievement-related attitudes and behaviors, and one of the mastery-oriented behaviors is the adoption of mastery goals. In virtually all cases, authors using the mental framework approach to goal orientation are unclear about the relative contributions of stable person and unstable situation affects on the person's goal orientation in a particular situation.
Beliefs. Perhaps the greatest irony present in the various definitional approaches to adult goal orientation is the infrequent use of definitions that focus on the individual's beliefs or implicit theories of ability (k ϭ 9; 10.2%). As can be seen in Table 2 , goal orientation, from this perspective, is thought of as following from an individual's beliefs or implicit theories concerning the malleability of ability (Dweck & Leggett, 1988, p. 262) . To be placed in this category, authors must have explicitly highlighted the primary role of beliefs or implicit theories in the individual's adoption of a goal orientation.
The relative absence of this perspective in the empirical goal orientation literature is noteworthy because it is the core aspect in Dweck's model of the goal orientation process (e.g., Dweck, 1996 Dweck, , 1999 Dweck & Leggett, 1988) . Specifically, Dweck et al. suggest that one's implicit theory of intelligence creates a meaning system that influences the types of goals that are salient to the individual (Dweck, 1986; Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Heyman & Dweck, 1992) . Individuals who believe that intelligence is a fixed characteristic of the person tend to adopt performance goals. They focus on gaining favorable judgments of competence or avoiding unfavorable judgments. In contrast, those who believe intelligence is malleable tend to adopt mastery or learning goals and focus on developing competence. In this model, beliefs about the malleability of ability lead individuals to adopt either a mastery or performance goal when engaging a task.
Summary. The multiple definitions of goal orientation provide an unstable foundation for research on the antecedents and consequences of the goal orientation construct. When examining the effects of goal orientation, should one focus on identifying individuals who possess a particular orientation (trait), manipulating the goals pursued by individuals (goals), manipulating the beliefs or implicit theories held by individuals (beliefs), or manipulating the salience of features in achievement contexts (quasi-trait)? Similar questions arise when attempting to apply the existing goal orientation definitions to actual organizational practices. Is goal orientation a selection issue (trait), a climate issue (beliefs and norms), or a developmental issue that may be managed through appropriate goal setting and feedback processes (goals)? The importance of differences in the conceptualization of goal orientation becomes even clearer as we move to examining issues of dimensionality, stability (e.g., state-trait), and operationalization.
Dimensionality
Consistent with the lack of agreement on the definition of goal orientation, researchers also differ with respect to the number of dimensions thought to underlie goal orientation. Current conceptualizations of goal orientation maintain that there are somewhere between one and six distinct facets of goal orientation. Goal orientation was originally conceived of as consisting of a single continuum ranging from learning goal orientation to performance goal orientation depending on the individual's beliefs about the malleability of ability. It was not considered possible to simultaneously believe that ability is both fixed and malleable, and so, from this perspective, individuals could not hold both goal orientations simultaneously (e.g., Ames & Archer, 1987; Dweck, 1986; Nicholls, 1984) . Later Dweck (1989) and others (e.g., Button et al., 1996) reasoned that it is possible for an individual to simultaneously strive to improve one's skills and to perform well relative to others. This perspective results in a two-dimensional approach to the goal orientation construct.
Achievement goal theorists such as Elliot, VandeWalle, and their respective colleagues (Brett & VandeWalle, 1999; Elliot, 1999; Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996; Elliot, McGregor, & Gable, 1999; Elliot, Sheldon, & Church, 1997; VandeWalle, 1997) have proposed the integration of approach-avoidance motivation into the conceptualization of goal orientation to create a third dimension of goal orientation. These authors recommend that the performance aspect of goal orientation should be broken down into two distinct dimensions of proving competence (performance approach) and avoiding the demonstration of incompetence (performance avoid). Grant and Dweck (2003) suggest that it is productive to break down performance-approach goals into goals oriented toward proving competence to others or proving competence to oneself. Other researchers have highlighted the importance of incorporating work avoidance or an alienation goal orientation (e.g., Archer, 1994; Cordon & Johnson, 2000; Wolters, 2003) . This form of goal orientation is relevant when achievement in a particular domain is not valued by the individual, and when forced to function in such a context the individual will strive to minimize expended effort.
More recently, Pintrich (2000a) and Elliot (1999; Elliot & McGregor, 2001 ) have suggested that a fourth dimension of goal orientation can be obtained by decomposing mastery goal orientation into two dimensions also based on the approach-avoid distinction. According to Elliot (1999) , the typical mastery goal orientation is an approach goal. Individuals desire to master tasks and thus they adopt mastery-approach goals. Both Pintrich (2000a) and Elliot and McGregor (2001) argue for the existence of a mastery-avoid goal, which represents individuals' striving to not fall short of task mastery. Elliot (1999) suggests that, although mastery-avoid goals are less common, an individual may set these goals under specific conditions, such as an expert who desires to avoid losing skills. Finally, Elliot and Thrash (2001) have taken this approach even further and proposed six distinct facets of goal orientation by crossing the ways that individuals might define competence (absolute, intrapersonal, or interpersonal) with the approach-avoid distinction.
Clearly, there are substantial differences in conceptualizations of the dimensions of goal orientation. To determine how these conceptual differences are manifested in the empirical goal orientation literature, we coded the conceptual treatment of the dimensionality presented in the studies included in this review. Our coding of this variable is provided in Table 1 . The general pattern of dimensionality is quite clear. Four studies (4.5%) included only the single dimension of mastery orientation. Fifty-five (62.5%) conceptualized goal orientation as consisting of two dimensions. Of these 55 studies, 2 by Strage (1997 Strage ( , 2000 conceived of the dimensions as being mastery and learned helplessness rather than the much more typical dimensions of mastery and performance. Twenty-three studies (26.1%) viewed goal orientation as consisting of three dimensions. Six of these 23 studies focused on the dimensions of mastery, performance, and work avoidance. The remaining studies used Elliot's trichotomous framework of mastery, performance-approach, and performance-avoid goal orientations. Three studies (3.4%) conceived goal orientation as consisting of the four distinct dimensions presented by Elliot and Thrash (2001) . Finally, inspection of Table 1 highlights the interesting fact that the pattern of dimensionality just presented has remained surprisingly stable across recent years.
Dimension Profiles
If goal orientation is conceptualized as consisting of two or more dimensions, profiles of goal orientation become relevant. The simplistic assumption that mastery orientation is good and performance orientation is bad is being challenged by a multipleorientations perspective in which a combination or profile of mastery and performance orientation results in desirable behavior and outcomes. Dweck (1989) made this point in her early writing on the topic, but this issue appears to have been lost in much of the early empirical research. Button et al. (1996) highlighted that a performance orientation is necessary in an organizational context because employees must contend with performance standards for an organization to be successful. They suggested that a balance of both orientations is adaptive in most work settings and note that "this style cannot be elucidated unless a two dimensional goal orientation approach is adopted" (p. 41). The idea that individuals can be simultaneously high or low on the dimensions of goal orientation has been referred to in various fashions, including a multiple-goal perspective (Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001; Harackiewicz, Barron, Tauer, Carter, & Elliot, 2000 ; see also Archer, 1994; Hofmann & Strickland, 1995; Pintrich, 2000a) , goal configurations (Schraw, Horn, Thorndike-Christ, & Bruning, 1995) , goal orientation patterns (Somuncuoglu & Yildirim, 1999) , and profiles (Bouffard, Boisvert, Vezeau, & Larouche, 1995) .
In Table 1 , we categorized researchers' use of a profile conceptualization of goal-oriented behavior. To be coded as endorsing a profile perspective of goal orientation, the researchers must have explicitly mentioned the possibility that individuals could have independent standing on the distinct goal orientations such that being high on one dimension (e.g., mastery orientation) does not simultaneously restrict standing on other goal orientation dimensions. This makes it possible for the individual to simultaneously have high levels of performance orientation. Alternatively, the authors could explicitly mention the possibility of simultaneously pursuing both performance and mastery goals.
Based on the results of our coding presented in Table 1 , it is clear that goal orientation researchers are not commonly using this more complex goal orientation perspective. Only 16 (18.2%) of the studies in our review conceptualized goal orientation using a profile perspective. There is no clear trend indicating that one definitional approach to goal orientation is more or less likely to endorse the importance of profiles. Only the mental framework conceptualization had no instances of researchers using a profile perspective, but this may be due to the relatively small number of studies using this perspective. Surprisingly, there is no evidence indicating that the use of the profile perspective is becoming more common in recent research. Examination of Table 1 highlights that there have been one or two studies each year from 1994 to 2002 that used this more complex perspective. Whatever the reason, it is clear that arguments favoring a profile approach to interpreting the dimensions of goal orientation (e.g., Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001; Button et al., 1996; Dweck, 1989; Pintrich, 2000b) have not yet affected research practice.
Of the studies that did use a profile or multiple-orientations perspective of goal orientation, it is useful to examine the analyses used to investigate goal orientation. The standard approach for analyzing the results of goal orientation research is to incorporate goal orientation dimensions into either an analysis of variance or regression model as main effects or simple predictors. However, a profile perspective requires that the same individual be allowed to be simultaneously high or low on each goal orientation dimension. Analytically, this means that the interactions of the goal orientation dimensions must be incorporated into the statistical model. Examination of Table 1 indicates that 5 of the 16 (31.3%) studies that highlighted the importance of a profile perspective did not analyze the research data in a way that allowed the investigation of profiles. Perhaps even more disturbing is the continued use of median splits to form goal orientation groups out of continuous measures of goal orientation despite the well-known limitations of this technique (e.g., G. H. McClelland & Judd, 1993) .
Stability Button et al. (1996) noted the absence of consensus about whether goal orientation should be treated as a stable trait or a state induced by salient features in the situation. Despite the large amount of research conducted since then, it remains unclear whether goal orientation is a disposition to behave that expresses itself in consistent patterns of functioning across a range of situations (a trait; Pervin, 1994) or a short-term, continuous, concrete way of thinking, acting, and feeling (a state; Fridhandler, 1986; Nesselroade, 1988) . To examine the manner in which researchers have approached this issue in the empirical literature, we coded the researchers' conceptualization of stability and present this information in Table 1 .
A study was coded as representing a stable conceptualization if the authors explicitly referred to goal orientation as a disposition or trait and made no mention of situational malleability or if the authors used language that distinguished types of individuals (e.g., mastery-oriented individuals) and provided no discussion of the situational malleability of the individual differences. Researchers using this perspective often comment on the stability of goal orientation over long periods of time (e.g., Dykman, 1998) and make person-based statements about goal orientation such as "the performance-oriented individual" (Fisher & Ford, 1998, p. 403; also see Franken & Brown, 1995; Madzar, 2001; Schraw et al., 1995; Strage, 1997) . If the authors explicitly recognized the impact of situational features on an individual's goal orientation, we coded the study as using a Person ϫ Situation interaction conceptualization of stability. Finally, a number of researchers viewed goal orientation as a highly unstable state induced by salient situational features. Studies representing this conceptualization of stability, or more appropriately instability, are coded as "context" in Table 1 . To be placed in this category, the authors must have explicitly highlighted the strong impact of situational cues on goal orientation and made no mention of personal or dispositional tendencies to adopt a particular orientation.
Another aspect of the stability conceptualizations of goal orientation is the issue of domain specificity. A number of researchers conceptualize goal orientation as stable but only within contexts or domains (e.g., VandeWalle, 1997) . We coded the authors' perspective on the domain specificity of goal orientation and report this information in Table 1 . To be placed in this category, authors must have either described goal orientation as a context-or domain-specific trait (Somuncuoglu & Yildirim, 1999; VandeWalle, 1997) or made qualified statements about goal orientation such as "academic goal orientations" (Schraw et al., 1995 ; see also Ames & Archer, 1987) .
The results of this coding process (see Table 1 ) highlight that there is substantial conceptual disagreement on the stability of goal orientation across situations, domains, and time. The majority of coded studies (k ϭ 41; 46.6%) conceived of goal orientation as being a stable characteristic of the person. Not surprisingly, this perspective was much more common for researchers using a trait perspective of goal orientation. Twenty-three of the studies (26.1%) viewed goal orientation as a combination of both personal and situational factors. The majority of these 21 studies (n ϭ 19) highlighted the dominant role of personal factors over situational factors in determining a person's goal orientation. The Person ϫ Situation interaction approach to goal orientation was not associated with any one definitional approach of goal orientation. Only 4 (4.5%) of the studies viewed goal orientation as a highly unstable, situationally induced process. In every case, this conceptualization of the stability of goal orientation was associated with researchers adopting a goal approach to the definition of goal orientation. Finally, 11 studies (12.5%) conceptualized goal orientation as a domain-specific variable. There is no clear association between the definitional approach adopted by the researchers who viewed goal orientation as domain specific; domain specificity may be conceptualized as the result of beliefs (e.g., Franken & Brown, 1995) , goals (e.g., Harackiewicz, Barron, Tauer, Carter, & Elliot, 2000) , or traits (e.g., VandeWalle, 1997). There does not appear to be a trend toward viewing goal orientation as a stable or situationally malleable construct. Each of these conceptualizations of stability continues to be used in current research.
Operational Inconsistencies
In addition to examining the conceptual inconsistencies present in the goal orientation literature, we also examined the variety of ways in which researchers have operationalized goal orientation (research design). As can be seen in Table 1 , most researchers measure the construct (k ϭ 70; 79.5%), but many use experimental manipulations (k ϭ 14; 15.9%), and a small percentage of studies (k ϭ 4; 4.5%) both measure and manipulate goal orientation. Once again, there appears to be no trend in whether goal orientation is manipulated or measured in the studies included in this review. The fact that some researchers measure goal orientation, whereas others manipulate it is consistent with different conceptualizations of situational effects on goal orientation. In this case, the fundamental issue is inconsistency in the conceptualization of goal orientation and not an operationalization problem per se. However, within each of these operational approaches, there is substantial inconsistency in the measurement or manipulation of the construct. The end result of these operational differences is a confusing array of findings that are difficult to portray as a body of research.
Measurement
We recorded whether the research used one of the many existing scales to assess goal orientation or developed a unique scale for the research (see Table 1 ). Of the 70 studies that measured goal orientation, a slight majority used an existing measure (k ϭ 49; 70%), but a very large proportion (k ϭ 30; 42.9%) used a selfdeveloped measure unique to the particular research study and the self-developed measures were almost always unvalidated. Also, a number of researchers modified an existing scale for their particular study (k ϭ 9; 12.9%). Of those researchers who used the Button et al. (1996) trait measure (k ϭ 13; 18.6%) followed by some variant of the VandeWalle (1997) domain-specific measure (k ϭ 7; 10.0%), the Elliot and Church (1997) goal measure (k ϭ 6; 8.6%), and the Roedel, Schraw, and Plake (1994) measure (k ϭ 4; 5.7%).
It is important to note that the most commonly used measures of goal orientation differ in substantial ways. The Button et al. (1996) and VandeWalle (1997) scales are both focused on personality assessments of goal orientation. The Button et al., (1996) measure uses two dimensions of goal orientation and is not domain specific, whereas VandeWalle's (1997) scale includes three dimensions of goal orientation (mastery, performance-approach, and performance-avoid) and is specific to the workplace. In contrast, the Elliot and Church (1997) scales focus on three dimensions of goal pursuits in a specific domain but do not focus on goal orientation as a personality trait. The key point is that there are substantial conceptual differences between the three most popular measures of goal orientation. This issue is compounded by the surprising lack of construct validation data that would support the idea that, irrespective of conceptual orientation, the measures converge toward a similar operationalization of goal orientation. As a result, identifying communalities in the antecedents and consequences of the self-report data using these scales is challenging if not impossible. This problem is magnified substantially by the large numbers of researchers who either modified existing measures or developed idiosyncratic measures of goal orientation. In short, the lack of consistency in the measurement of goal orientation makes it unclear what the measures of goal orientation actually assess, and the impact of these differences on the comparability of results across research studies is highly uncertain.
Manipulation
A number of research studies investigated the effects of goal orientation through manipulating factors thought to effect goal orientation (k ϭ 18; 20.5%). Given the various conceptualizations of goal orientation presented earlier, it is not surprising that the focus of the manipulations is not consistent. Approximately half of the attempted manipulations of goal orientation targeted beliefs. Wood and Bandura (1989) , for example, told participants in their mastery condition that certain skills were developed through practice and told those in the performance condition that the skills reflect basic cognitive capabilities that people possess (see also Morf, Weir, & Davidov, 2000; Steele-Johnson, Beauregard, Hoover, & Schmidt, 2000) . Roberson and Alsua (2002) manipulated individuals' beliefs about ability by simultaneously manipulating interpersonal competition and the perceived malleability of a skill. Their experiment, which occurs in a personnel selection context, framed a training activity as either an opportunity to develop and improve a skill (mastery condition) or as an opportunity to test and demonstrate the skill (performance condition; see also Nordstrom, Wendland, & Williams, 1998) .
Approximately 26% of the studies that manipulated goal orientation focused on the manipulation of the goals adopted by participants. In general, individuals are given a learning (mastery) goal or a performance goal. That is, individuals are given the goal of developing their skills or the goal of demonstrating their skill through performance (e.g., Barron & Harackiewicz, 2001 , Study 2; Gist & Stevens, 1998; Stevens & Gist, 1997) . Elliot and Harackiewicz (1996) used a similar manipulation with both performanceapproach and performance-avoid goals.
Finally, a sizable proportion (14%) of the experimental approach to goal orientation manipulated situational strength. For example, researchers attempt to induce varying degrees of performance orientation by manipulating the degree to which a situation is interpersonally competitive (e.g., Jagacinski & Nicholls, 1984; Morf et al., 2000) or the degree to which mistakes are acceptable (e.g., Martocchio, 1994) . For example, in his performance orientation manipulation, Martocchio (1994) told participants not to make mistakes but told participants in his mastery condition that mistakes are normal and that practice makes perfect. Again, the differences in the manipulations used to research goal orientation reflect conceptual differences and make it difficult to compare results across studies.
Taken as a whole, the confusing array of conceptualizations and operationalizations of goal orientation have resulted in a literature that is nearly impossible to summarize. However, when interpreting these differences, we emphasize that the substantial variation in the conceptualization and operationalization of goal orientation is not necessarily a problem. In fact, most topics that receive vigorous research attention may be characterized by a diversity of opinion and strong scientific disagreements. In many cases, the ensuing heated debate on the appropriate conceptualizations and operationalizations are often the source of substantial theoretical and empirical gains. We fear, however, that this is not the case in goal orientation research. With the exception of Elliot and Thrash (2001) and to a lesser extent Phillips and Gully (1997) , the authors in the empirical research on this construct did not acknowledge that there are other perspectives on the appropriate conceptualization of goal orientation and provide a justification for the adopted perspective. It is as though multiple conceptualizations of goal orientation are being researched in parallel over time but not interacting with each other or engaging in debate over the most productive conceptualization or boundary conditions. We believe that the first step in engaging in this process is the recognition that there is a problem. Thus, it is our hope that the documentation of the many various approaches that we provide here will stimulate healthy scientific debate on the topic of achievement motivation and goal orientation. We now present a model of goal orientation that represents our attempt to clarify and integrate varied goal orientation perspectives.
The Model: Motivated Action Theory One fortunate outcome of the numerous inconsistencies in the goal orientation literature is that they provide clear guidance on the questions that must be answered by a comprehensive model of goal orientation. How stable is goal orientation over time and situations? Is goal orientation a situationally determined state or a relatively stable disposition? How many dimensions of goaloriented behavior compose goal orientation? Does goal orientation comprise one bipolar dimension, two independent dimensions, three independent or hierarchically structured dimensions, or even more facets of motivated behavior? What effect do beliefs (e.g., implicit theories) have on a person's goal orientations? Should It is important to emphasize that the study of goal orientation is fundamentally an examination of choice behavior in achievement contexts. Individuals must choose, either consciously or subconsciously, to engage in certain types of behaviors in achievement situations. The pattern of these behavioral choices provides insight into the goal orientation construct. For instance, faced with an achievement situation, individuals with high levels of mastery orientation may choose to engage in adaptive behavioral patterns such as selecting challenging tasks, setting difficult goals, and persisting when obstacles are encountered. In contrast, individuals high in performance orientation might choose to avoid challenging tasks, set low goals, and choose to engage in self-handicapping behavior when difficulties are encountered. To model the cognitive and behavioral choices that reflect goal orientation adequately, it is necessary to explain choice behavior as it unfolds dynamically over time and across achievement contexts.
Moreover, in the work environment, individuals have multiple goals continuously vying for the control of attention. The relevant question is rarely which course of action to follow but rather how to best allocate resources and switch between tasks to efficiently accomplish the multiple goals. To do this, people must make repeated choices over time concerning where to focus their attention and actions and revise these decisions in response to changes in the environment (Brehman, 1992; Diehl & Sterman, 1995; Luce, 1995) . Therefore, a model of goal orientation must integrate decision making, personality, and motivation into a dynamic perspective that accounts for a stream of behavior in the service of competing goals over time (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Phillips, & Hedlund, 1994; Kanfer, 1990; Kuhl & Atkinson, 1984; Luce, 1995) .
To address these issues, we present a motivated action theory (MAT) model of goal-oriented behavior in achievement contexts. MAT is an extension of self-regulation and goal-directed action models (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998; Frese & Zapf, 1994; Hyland, 1988; R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994; G. A. Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960; Powers, 1973) . The foundational assumptions underlying MAT are that action is directed toward the attainment of goals (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Heckhausen, 1991; Srull & Wyer, 1986) , that goals are hierarchically structured within the individual such that high-level goals are distal desired states and lower level goals are means to obtain the higher level goals, that a single goal controls action at any point in time, that activation levels determine which goal guides behavior at a given point in time, and that situational features interact dynamically with activated goals to affect choice and behavior. These assumptions are elaborated and qualified later. For the remainder of this presentation, goals are construed as "internal representations of desired states where states are broadly construed as outcomes, events, and processes" (Austin & Vancouver, 1996) . From this perspective, the term goal encompasses values, needs, drives, and any other desired standards against which current states may be evaluated.
Goal Structure
Many important aspects of MAT are conveyed in the set of highly interconnected goals presented in Figure 1 . The most salient feature in Figure 1 is the hierarchical structure of goals. To ease presentation, only four goal levels are considered in this representation, ranging from high-level goals that compose the self to lower order action plans that detail rough guidelines or strategies for achieving the higher order goals. This graphic representation of goals and their relations may be stated formally as follows: Postulate 1. Goals are hierarchically structured such that higher level goals specify the purpose ("why") of action and lower level goals provide increasingly specific actions ("how") required to accomplish the higher level goals. The existence of hierarchical structures that either control or affect choice and behavior is not a source of much controversy. Many different hierarchical specifications exist, each of which is founded on distinctive assumptions and typically addresses different aspects of behavior. For instance, Powers's (1973) control theory model incorporates 11 distinct goal levels; Newell's (1990) model of cognition incorporates four levels (social, rational, cognitive, and biological); Cropanzano, James, and Citera's (1993) hierarchical model uses four levels (values, self-identities, personal projects, and task goals); Frese and Zapf's (1994) action theory also consists of four distinct hierarchical levels (heuristic, intellectual, flexible action patterns, and sensorimotor); and Beach's (e.g., 1990 ) hierarchical decision-making model uses three levels (values, trajectories, and strategies). It is also interesting to note that personality theory appears to be converging on a hierarchical approach to studying individual differences in personality (e.g., Ashton, 1998; Paunonen, 1998; Paunonen & Nicol, 2001) .
The four levels that top the goal hierarchy in MAT consist of self goals, principle goals, achievement goals, and action plan goals. In general, self goals are the fundamental outcomes that all individuals must achieve, to some extent, to lead normal, healthy, fulfilling lives. Goals at this level of analysis are the focus of virtually all research on the self, such as self-discrepancy theory (Higgins, 1989a) , self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) , selfevaluation maintenance theory (Tesser, 1988) , self-verification theory (Swann, 1983) , and self-assessment theory (Trope, 1986) . Serious psychological and physical health problems are known to be associated with large discrepancies on any one of these fundamental goals.
Self goals are desired outcomes but they do not provide a means to achieve the desired goals. Therefore, to achieve self goals, individuals must engage in actions to achieve goals at the principle goal level. Following Powers (1973) , principle goals are general heuristics or behavioral principles that serve as guides for clusters of behavior. Goals at this level have names found in common language such as integrity, hardworking, fair, and friendly and are analogous to the subdimensions of personality (e.g., Ashton, 1998; Paunonen, 1998) . So, for instance, one way for an individual to achieve the affiliation goal is to behave in a helpful manner. Alternatively, an individual may work toward the agency goal by behaving in a studious manner. There are, of course, many more principle goals than are presented in Figure 1 . Normally, the goal hierarchy would appear as a pyramid that rapidly increases in complexity as one moves down the goal levels. However, some degree of simplicity is obtained by limiting the focus of this presentation to goals most relevant to striving in achievement contexts, and so the representation of goals in Figure 1 may be thought of as a vertical slice of goals, relevant to achievement strivings, which are part of a much larger goal structure. In general, as one moves down the goal hierarchy in Figure 1 , the content of the goals becomes increasingly relevant to behavior in achievement contexts. The cost incurred by this simplifying choice is a lack of generalizability across other contexts and types of strivings (e.g., family goals, relationship goals, leisure goals); however, a structurally similar model could be developed for other areas.
The third level of goals in Figure 1 consists of the achievement goals most closely associated with Elliot's (e.g., ) model of goal orientation. These intermediate goals reflect the general action patterns that individuals use in achievement situations to pursue principle goals. In other words, depending on the relative salience of the different principle goals, an individual will adopt an achievement goal that suits the profile of principle goals being pursued. Thus, if the individual perceives that the potential for growth in a situation is outweighed by the threat to standing on one or more of the other principle goals, then the individual will pursue an achievement goal that reduces the likelihood of the potential threatening outcome. Although we adopt the achievement goals specified by Elliot et al., we do not subscribe to Elliot's perspective on the antecedents of the achievement goals as directed only toward competence through need for achievement and fear of failure motives.
The final level in Figure 1 consists of action plan goals. Perceiving a situation as a threat and striving to avoid a loss of self-esteem or social value does not provide a clear mechanism for accomplishing this goal. Instead, a person needs to develop an action plan to accomplish the goal. Action plans are highly flexible strategies, pathways, or trajectories for achieving desired goals. They are analogous to mental models or mental simulations that allow a person to cognitively evaluate the acceptability of a plan and the likelihood (i.e., expectancy) of achieving the desired outcomes using the plan. The plans make it possible to evaluate different action plans before actions are implemented. So, for instance, a person might develop and evaluate various action plans for introducing a controversial idea in an upcoming meeting or presentation. Once an action plan is identified or developed, it cues attention to opportunities and means present in situations that facilitate goal accomplishment (Gollwitzer, 1996) .
Of course, additional levels of increasingly specific goals are required to adequately reflect the variety and flexibility of human action. For instance, to enact an action plan (e.g., seek feedback), a person must select or construct a more specific action sequence (seek diagnostic feedback from the supervisor). Each action sequence consists of a number of action steps at the next lower level of the goal hierarchy (walk to the supervisor's office, ask to speak with the supervisor, speak to the supervisor) that need to be carried out in a specific order. Otherwise, a person could initiate a conversation with the supervisor while sitting alone in one's office or knock on the inside of one's own office door instead of the supervisor's office door. Any action step, such as walking to the supervisor's office, consists of a motor sequence (e.g., walking). Each motor sequence consists of a series of motor steps (lifting a leg or swinging an arm). To accomplish each of these motor steps, there are many subgoals that become increasingly biological or neurological in character.
The hierarchical representation of goals in Figure 1 is not particularly innovative, and other hierarchical specifications would likely work equally well. In fact, the goal hierarchy presented in Figure 1 merges many aspects of other hierarchical specifications such as Powers's (1973) principle goal level, Frese and Zapf's (1994) flexible action patterns, and Elliot's ) achievement goal level. In hierarchical models of cognition and action, representations at the higher levels specify the meaning, or the "why," of action and goals lower in the hierarchy specify the "how," or means, for accomplishing the higher level goals (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1996; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) . Consistent with the goal dimensions presented by Austin and Vancouver (1996) , higher level goals are generally less specific than lower level goals, and so it is more difficult to evaluate progress toward higher level goals than toward lower level goals. Higher level goals typically refer to more distal outcomes than lower level goals. After all, to meet the higher level goals, one must first achieve the subgoals. As Vallacher and Wegner (1989) have demonstrated, midlevel goals are more consciously accessible than are high-level or low-level goals. Finally, goals at higher levels are more likely to be common across individuals even though the importance of the high-level goals may differ substantially.
For current purposes, the optimal number of goal levels and the correct number of goals in each level are not as critical as the general functioning of the hierarchical structure of goals. The connections among the goals in Figure 1 are critically important and represent a departure from many other hierarchical goal specifications. In MAT, goals are massively interconnected both within and across levels. The connections may be either excitatory or inhibitory (positively or negatively weighted) such that doing one action increases the likelihood of doing another complementary action or decreases the likelihood of performing a competing action (e.g., Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003) . The connections are represented as double-headed arrows, indicating that the flow of action may result from discrepancies on higher level goals (top-down processing) or lower level goals (bottom-up processing) as a result of encountering obstacles or environmental changes (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994) .
The large number of connections to lower level goals represents the principle of equifinality (McDougal, 1923; Heider, 1958) , meaning that many different actions can be used to meet higher level goals. This principle also highlights the substitutability of actions (Atkinson & Birch, 1970; Henle, 1942; Lewin, 1935; Shah & Kruglanski, 2000) , such that one action can substitute for another in accomplishing a higher order goal. In addition, lower level actions are connected to multiple higher order goals, depicting the principle of multifinality (Broadbent, 1985; Shah & Kruglanski, 2000; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987 ), meaning a single lower level action may serve to meet multiple higher level goals simultaneously. The only current limitation imposed on the interconnection of goals in MAT is that connections between goals may not skip levels. In other words, the connection of achievement goals to self goals occurs only through principle goals. This pattern of goal interconnectivity may be stated formally as follows:
Conjecture 1. Goals in the goal hierarchy are massively interconnected both within goal level and between adjacent goal levels. The structure of inhibitory and excitatory interconnections is responsible for the principles of top-down and bottom-up processing, goal equifinality, goal substitutability, and goal multifinality.
This conjecture is reasonable given current knowledge but will likely need to be revised as further empirical results accumulate.
Goal Content
Viewing goals as hierarchically structured is relatively free of risk. The general idea is well accepted and spans virtually all areas of scientific investigations of human cognition, motivation, and behavior (e.g., Newell, 1990) . However, to actually implement a particular goal hierarchy to understand and predict behavior, it is necessary to specify the content of goals at each level in the hierarchy. This is a topic in which strong disagreements may occur. After all, goals placed higher in the hierarchy are, by definition, more important or fundamental to the functioning of the person than goals placed lower in the hierarchy. Similarly, goals at the same level in the hierarchy are treated, to some extent, as equally important. The ordering of specific goals in the hierarchy has been a source of contention since the beginning of philosophical treatments of behavior and willpower, and we do not expect to resolve these arguments here. Instead, what follows is an attempt to integrate a large body of literature into a cohesive and useful perspective on goals. This representation is, without question, incomplete. It is simply a starting point to be refined as data accumulate.
One of the major difficulties encountered by hierarchical goal representations is specifying the goal contents at the top of the hierarchy. After all, what are the ultimate goals that individuals seek? To avoid theological and philosophical debate over the ultimate purpose of being, we focus on goal states that meet Baumeister and Leary's (1995) criteria for fundamental goal status. The goals at the top of the hierarchy in MAT all have clear connections with physical and mental health, and when discrepancies on these fundamental goals are large, not much else matters to the individual. Three themes occur across virtually all motivational theory and research. First, individuals are highly motivated to achieve and maintain the perception that they can affect or control important aspects of their environment. Following Bandura (2001), we refer to this as the agency goal. Second, individuals are strongly motivated to achieve and maintain a positive self-image. Following G. W. Allport (1955) , we refer to this as the esteem goal. Finally, individuals are social beings, and the need to belong or be affiliated with a group of other individuals is an extremely strong motivation, resulting in severe repercussions if not met. Following Murray (1938) and D. C. McClelland (1951) , we refer to this as the affiliation goal. This approach to the goal content at the highest level of representation may be stated formally as follows:
Proposition 1. All individuals possess, in varying degrees, the highest level goals of agency, esteem, and affiliation.
Self Goals
Agency. Unless individuals believe that they can act to produce desired effects and to overcome undesired effects in their environment, then there is no reason to act at all. Without this belief, the world would appear to be completely chaotic, and basic cause-and-effect relations would not hold with respect to the individual's actions. Under these conditions, pursuing goals or persisting when difficulties are encountered would be pointless (Bandura, 1997) , and behavior would be consistent with Seligman's research on reactions to uncontrollable shock (e.g., W. R. Miller & Seligman, 1975) . Bandura (2001) maintains that believing in and increasing agency (personal control over one's environment) is the most fundamental aspect of human existence. Similarly, deCharms (1968) stated that "man's primary motivational propensity is to be effective in producing changes in his environment." Other perspectives on the critical importance of agency can be found in the intrinsic motivation literature, in which it is believed that the fundamental human goal is to increase competency and self-determination (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985; Elliot et al., 2000; R. W. White, 1959) . Failure to establish agency is strongly related to poor physical health and chronic depression (Seligman, 1991) . In fact, this goal is so fundamental to human pursuits that individuals will delude themselves into believing that they are able to control aspects of their environment that are, in fact, uncontrollable or random (e.g., Langer, 1975; Langer & Roth, 1975) .
Esteem. Of all the higher level goals, the esteem goal is certainly the best researched. Virtually every personality and self theory maintains that viewing oneself positively is fundamental to human functioning (e.g., G. W. Allport, 1955; Epstein, 1973; James, 1890; Maslow, 1943; Rogers, 1951; Sheldon, Elliot, Kim, & Kasser, 2001; Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988) . In general, individuals have inflated levels of self-esteem (e.g., Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; E. Diener & Diener, 1996) , actively seek information to confirm the positive view of self (e.g., Steele, 1988; Tesser, 1988) , and seek to further enhance self-value (e.g., Blaine & Crocker, 1993; Greenwald, 1980; Taylor & Brown, 1988) . High self-esteem is critically important to mental health (e.g., Baumeister, 1993; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Taylor & Brown, 1988) , and negative views of the self are highly associated with depression (e.g., Coleman & Beck, 1981) . According to terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004) , people need self-esteem to manage the anxiety arising from the knowledge that they will eventually die and that the time of death is unpredictable. Without self-esteem, this knowledge would be paralyzing, and progress toward important goals would be severely impacted. Crocker and Park (2004) indicated that the pursuit of self-esteem can result in unhealthy outcomes depending on the actions used by the individual to pursue the self-esteem goal. This perspective does not deny that individuals invest substantial effort into the pursuit of self-esteem but instead suggests that a subset of the methods used to pursue self-esteem may be unhealthy.
Affiliation. Baumeister and Leary (1995) provide strong support for the position that developing and maintaining interpersonal attachments is a fundamental motive, evolved for adaptive purposes, that results in people having a strong desire to belong to social entities like groups and organizations. The importance of affiliation goals to human functioning is recognized in virtually all models of human behavior (e.g., Bowlby, 1969; Maslow, 1968; D. C. McClelland, 1951; Murray, 1938) . Further, individuals experience severe anxiety when they face exclusion from their social groups (Barden, Garber, Leiman, Ford, & Masters, 1985) , and one of the most severe punishments society inflicts is solitary confinement. The empirical support, reviewed by Baumeister and Leary (1995) , for affiliation as a fundamental human motive is impressive and extremely difficult to discount.
Principle Goals
Growth. Now that the three highest level goals have been presented, we shift our attention to the principle goal level and focus on those principle goals we believe to be most relevant to achievement behavior. The first principle goal in Figure 1 is growth. To achieve ever increasing levels of agency, a person must grow, learn, develop, and explore. Maslow (1968) placed this goal at the top of his hierarchy and focused on a nearly spiritual movement toward self-actualization. Alderfer (1972) viewed growth goals from a highly intrinsic perspective focused on acquiring and exercising skills to the fullest extent possible. In contrast, we view growth goals as a desire to understand one's environment and to develop the skills necessary to affect the environment to meet the higher level self goals. We believe that growth goals subsume motivational variables such as the need to understand (e.g., Murray, 1938) , need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) , and the competence motive (R. W. White, 1959) .
Fairness. In general, issues of fairness and judgment have not been well integrated into motivational perspectives on behavior (e.g., Mitchell & Daniels, 2003) . Given the powerful effects of fairness perceptions on behavior (e.g., Greenberg, 1987; Lind & Tyler, 1988) , this is an unfortunate oversight. Cosmides and Tooby (1992) argue from an evolutionary perspective that humans have evolved in highly complex social systems, and for these systems to function appropriately there must be guidelines for social exchange. In other words, there are expectations derived from evolutionary pressures for give-and-take relations such that if a person gets something from you they are expected to give something back. As a result of this developmental history, Cosmides (1989) argues that humans have developed automatic, hard-wired cheater detection schemas that allow individuals to detect violations of social exchange rules. Thus, although individuals may be motivated to act selfishly for short-term gain, the possibility of being detected and facing long-term social punishment and rejection inhibits these actions. This perspective is supported by theory and research suggesting that individuals have a strong desire or need to believe in a just world (Hafner, 2000; Learner, 1980) . Structure. A number of motivational approaches address an individual's desire to exist in a structured environment with unambiguous rules that guide behavior. Various terms, such as tolerance for ambiguity (Shaffer & Hendrick, 1974) , need for structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993) , and need for cognitive closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) , are used to describe this robust individual difference in contextual preferences. Although referred to as a need for cognition, Cohen (1957; Cohen, Stotland, & Wolfe, 1955 ) conceptualized a similar variable such that "stronger needs lead people to see a situation as ambiguous even if it is relatively structured, indicating that higher standards for cognitive clarity are associated with greater need for cognition" (p. 292). Adams (1959) demonstrated that individuals who strive for high levels of cognitive clarity avoid ambiguity by using heuristics and expert advice to understand their environment rather than carefully evaluating information for themselves. With respect to social interactions, Shah, Kruglanski, and Thompson (1998) found that individuals with high need for closure were more positively disposed toward in-groups and more negatively disposed toward out-groups, indicating a clear desire for boundaries, than were their counterparts with low need for closure, even if the groups were artificial and temporary constructions in the laboratory.
Social value. An individual's standing in a group meets many higher order goals. High levels of social status impart power, and power serves agency goals by making it possible for an individual to modify others' states by providing or withholding resources or administering punishments (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003 ). An individual's respect and prominence in a group results in control over social resources and punishments (C. Anderson, John, Keltner, & Kring, 2001; Barkow, 1975) . Social standing also has strong connections to esteem and affiliation goals. To maintain and increase standing on esteem and affiliation goals, individuals pay very close attention to relationship status information (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; . In addition to these aspects of social standing, Urdan and Maehr (1995) suggest that achievement motivation research has generally not accounted for the social aspects of achievement behavior. Individuals may engage in achievement behavior to be a productive citizen (social welfare goal), to bring pride and honor to the family (social solidarity goal), or to gain the approval or respect of peers. The content of goals at the principle level of the goal hierarchy may be summarized using the following conjecture.
Conjecture 2. In situations construed by the individual as emphasizing achievement, the principle goals of growth, fairness, structure, and social value provide the primary vehicles for obtaining the higher level self goals.
Achievement Goals
As discussed previously, various authors treat goal orientation as having somewhere between one (e.g., Dweck, 1986) and six (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2001 ) distinct facets. In our view, the most compelling model of achievement goals responsible for goal orientation behavior is obtained by crossing the approach and avoidance aspects of behavior with mastery and performance goals (e.g., Elliot & McGregor, 2001; Pintrich, 2000a) . The approach and avoidance aspects of motivated action are fundamental to human behavior (Carver, 1996) and are represented in virtually every model of behavior (for a review, see Elliot & Thrash, 2002, and Higgins, 1997) . Even the early theoretical treatments of goal orientation recognized the importance of approach and avoidance aspects of behavior (e.g., Nicholls, 1984) . However, at this point in time, we have not incorporated the mastery-avoid goal into MAT. This choice is based on the fact that avoiding a loss of mastery is likely only applicable to a very limited number of experts in a particular domain. In addition, empirical research strongly supports the distinction between performance-approach actions and performance-avoid actions (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2002) . However, only limited empirical data are available that supports the masteryavoid goal. Therefore, the dimensionality of achievement goals incorporated into MAT is consistent with the three-dimensional perspective espoused by Elliot (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2002) and VandeWalle (1997) .
For now, the three achievement goals used in MAT are sufficient for capturing the major differences in behavior that occur in achievement settings. However, as more data are collected and inconsistencies identified, it will be important to further specify the goals responsible for action. In this case, the goals at the principle level of analysis could be crossed with motivational distinction between approach and avoid dimensions of behavior to yield a very flexible approach to modeling achievement goals. Future changes in the dimensionality of achievement goals will not alter the basic structure or functioning of MAT. The current content of goals at the achievement goal level of the goal hierarchy may be summarized using the following conjecture.
Conjecture 3. In situations construed by the individual as emphasizing achievement, the achievement goals of masteryapproach, performance-approach, and performance-avoid provide the primary vehicles for obtaining the higher level principle goals.
Action Plan Goals
The action plan goals that may be used to meet the achievement goals are too varied to enumerate. However, the existing goal orientation literature highlights some common behavioral themes that occur in achievement contexts (e.g., Ames, 1992; Dweck, 1986; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliot & Dweck, 1988; Nicholls, 1984) . Individuals pursuing mastery goals use feedback on their own past performance to evaluate current performance, focus attention on acquiring knowledge and improving skills, are not concerned about mistakes and frequently explore a task, and make many mistakes in the process. Students with performance-approach goals focus on achieving a high level of performance with the appearance of minimal effort, do not engage in mistake-prone exploration, and evaluate performance with respect to others. Finally, individuals pursuing performance-avoidance goals engage in a number of withdrawal behaviors such as selfhandicapping, task disengagement, and off-task cognitions. The content of goals at the action plan level of the goal hierarchy may be summarized using the following conjecture.
Conjecture 4. In situations construed by the individual as emphasizing achievement, the action plan goals specify behaviors that may be selected by the individual to obtain the higher level achievement goals.
Discrepancy Detection
Each goal in the hierarchy is thought to be monitored by a discrepancy monitoring system that compares the current state of the person to the goal states (Carver & Scheier, 1998 ; R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994) . The negative-feedback loop presented in Figure 2 is a reasonable approximation of how the discrepancy monitoring system associated with each goal functions. Basically, a sensory system detects the current state of the environment. A comparison is then made between the current state and the desired goal state. The discrepancy or error that results from this comparison triggers an output function that filters down through the hierarchy until a relevant behavior is enacted to reduce the discrepancy. The environment is changed both through the actions taken by the person and by naturally occurring environmental forces beyond the control of the individual. The sensory system again checks the status of the environment, and the process continues.
On the surface, the assumption that discrepancies are monitored for all goals instead of those currently in the focus of attention might appear to be psychologically implausible because substantial parallel information processing is required for this model to function. However, to maintain behavioral flexibility in response to environmental changes, there must be some mechanism that is capable of detecting change with respect to nonfocal goals and capturing attention (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994) . Otherwise, an individual in the pursuit of a high-level goal, such as being viewed as hardworking, might not recognize that the noises emanating from the machinery being used to cut metal signal danger and that a safer course of action would be to halt work. Discrepancy detection across goal levels provides a source of activation that captures attention and makes it possible for lower level goals to wrest control of behavior from higher level goals.
This perspective is consistent with research suggesting that human information processing is highly sensitive to errors and discrepancy information. For instance, it is clear that discrepancy detection occurs automatically even when attention is focused on other aspects of the environment (Hilton, Klein, & von Hipple, 1991 ; J. D. White & Carlson, 1983) . The sensitivity to discrepancies is so fundamental to human information processes that it appears to be a hard-wired function of the brain associated with the anterior cingulate cortex (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997) , and deficits in this system are associated with psychological disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder (Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000) . The existing data support the following conjecture.
Conjecture 5. The individual's goals are simultaneously and automatically monitored for discrepancies between the current states and the desired states both within and across goal levels.
Goals and Action
The linkage of the individual's goals to behavior or actions implemented to achieve the goals is a fundamental issue in the social sciences. MAT incorporates a very restrictive approach to this linkage represented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: At any fixed time point, action is directed toward reducing a discrepancy on a single goal.
This perspective on the goal-action linkage does not mean that a particular action can only reduce discrepancies on a single goal but rather that actions are directed toward the accomplishment of a single goal. Proposition 3 is supported by two distinct theoretical frameworks. First, models of attention, such as D. A. Allport's (1989) selection-for-action model and Rothbart's (1991, 1998) selection-for-thought model, highlight the functionality of focusing attention on a limited set of goal-relevant stimuli (both internal and external to the individual). Humans have a limited number of sensors (e.g., eyes and ears) and effectors (e.g., hands and feet); therefore, to accomplish goals, it is necessary to enact a behavioral sequence and then to protect the action sequence from competing goals and actions until the action is completed. Integrated actions require the selection of particular aspects or attributes from the environment that are relevant to the action at hand. At the same time, information irrelevant to the action must be ignored or inhibited (e.g., Shah, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2002) . Thus, attentional processes are viewed as the selection of action-relevant events or stimuli relying on particular action plans. Behavioral coherence in the pursuit of goals is achieved by sequentially enacting behaviors and then protecting the goals and behaviors from distraction as they are carried out.
The selection-for-action process is highly flexible. As D. A. Allport (1989) highlighted, the attentional process that protects goals and actions cannot be absolute. It is important that the person be able to monitor the environment and switch goals and actions quickly in response to environmental changes that present either threats or opportunities. In fact, switching between goals and action sequences may happen so quickly that it appears that the individual is simultaneously pursuing multiple goals that require distinct actions (D. A. Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; D. A. Allport & Wylie, 2000) . The focus of attention in the goal hierarchy is flexible and may move up or down the goal hierarchy as a function of progress toward the goal (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994) . This approach to the linkage between multiple goals and actions leads to the following corollary of Proposition 3.
Corollary 1. The appearance of simultaneous task performance (e.g., multitasking) designed to simultaneously reduce discrepancies on multiple goals reflects rapid switching or oscillation between goals and the actions connected to these goals that serve to reduce discrepancies on the multiple goals.
The second source of support for this perspective on goals, action, and attention is found in Wegner's (1987, 1989 ) action identification theory. If asked at any specific point in time, individuals report only doing one thing. The specificity of the reported goal appears to vary to some extent across individuals such that some individuals provide more abstract responses to this probe, whereas others provide very concrete responses. However, irrespective of the reported goal level, individuals invariably identify their actions with respect to a single goal at a time. Action identities that possess substantial detail are called low-level identities, and those that possess little detail are referred to as highlevel identities. As individuals gain experience with a task, they tend to move up in the action identification hierarchy and use the more efficient, higher level action identities (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) . In contrast, when obstacles to goal completion are encountered or actions are disrupted, the identification of action moves down the hierarchy and individuals describe their actions in more detail (Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984) . Vallacher and Wegner (1987) suggest that the optimal identity level is the highest identity that an individual can use to maintain an action.
In action identification theory, middle-level actions are most commonly the focus of attention, similar to Rosch's (e.g., Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976 ) basic level in categorization theory. In MAT, the most common focus of attention probably occurs at the achievement goal level. If you ask people taking a selection test what they are doing, they will most likely tell you that they are trying to do well on the test rather than connecting their actions to higher level goals such as striving for agency. Individuals rarely focus directly on esteem or affiliation goals unless events make the high level goals salient. Similarly, when eating breakfast, individuals rarely focus attention on picking up a cup of coffee. That behavioral sequence is automatized and does not capture attention unless an obstacle is encountered when trying to enact the behavioral sequence (e.g., an unexpected spoon in the coffee cup). Similar processes may be found in the problem-solving literature on subgoal creation when obstacles to problem solution are encountered (VanLehn, 1989) . These general findings lead to the following conjecture for a basic level representation of goals in achievement contexts.
Conjecture 6. In situations construed by the individual as emphasizing achievement, the achievement goal level is the default or basic level foci of attention.
Spreading Activation
In MAT the dynamic flow of behavior over time is determined through a spreading activation process similar to that used in Anderson's ACT-R model of semantic knowledge in declarative memory (J. R. Anderson, 1990 Anderson, , 1993 . As stated in Conjecture 1 and depicted in Figure 1 , goal structures are highly interconnected both across and within goal levels. As with semantic knowledge structures, the connections between goals can be either excitatory (positive) or inhibitory (negative). In other words, response tendencies (e.g., using a hand to type on the computer keyboard vs. using a hand to scratch an itch) that directly compete with the currently activated goal are inhibited. This reflects findings in the area of selective attention demonstrating that competing responses (actions or thoughts) are inhibited to maintain and protect the focus on a particular, selected response (D. A. Allport, 1989; Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991; Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Rypma, 1991; Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000) . Similarly, response tendencies that are consistent with the currently activated goal receive increased levels of activation (e.g., cutting vegetables may prompt sharpening a knife). It is important to highlight that the analogy drawn here between goal structures and knowledge structures should not be taken too far. At this point, not enough is known about goal structures to determine whether they are simply special types of knowledge and conform to what we know about associative memory structures or whether they are in some way distinct and require new models to be adequately represented.
There are two central aspects of the spread of goal activation in MAT. First, the activation of a particular goal is a function of the activation levels of the other goals in the goal hierarchy that have weighted connections with the goal. Activation flows in both directions, such that when higher level goals are activated, either by external factors in the environment or by internal goal-related cognitions, activation spreads throughout the goal network consistent with the weights connecting the goals. Similarly, when lowlevel goals receive increased activation through the detection of discrepancies, activation spreads upward through the network of goals (R. G. Lord & Levy, 1994) consistent with weights on the goal linkages. This flow of activation among goals allows for both top-down or bottom-up processes to influence behavior. Second, changes in the perception of discrepancy between the current state and a particular goal state alter the activation level of the particular goal and, because of the massive interconnectivity of goals in the goal hierarchy, the activation level of other goals connected to the particular goal.
As a starting point, an activation function similar to that used in J. L. McClelland and Rumelhart's (1981) interactive activation model and Holyoak and Thagard's (1989) ACME is used in MAT.
Specifically, the activation of a goal at time t ϩ 1 is conceptualized as a ij͑tϩ1͒ ϭ a ij͑t͒ ϩ w ij͑t͒ a ij͑t͒ , (1) where a ij is the activation of the ith goal at the jth level of the goal hierarchy, t is a time indicator, and w ij is the weight linking goals both within and across levels. At this point, the overall activation level of a goal at time t ϩ 1 is a function of its activation level at time t along with the weighted sum of all the activation levels of the goals connected to the goal. Given this, the activation level of a goal may be negative if the sum of inhibitory connections outweighs the sum of excitatory connections to a greater extent than the current positive activation level. Equation 1 highlights that the activation level of a given goal is simply a linear composite of the previous goal activation level and the weighted sum of all the activation levels of the goals connected to the particular goal. As such, Equation 1 captures the first aspect of spreading activation in goal hierarchies highlighted previously. Although this function is a reasonable starting point in the study of goal activations, it is likely too simple to capture the complex relations between goals. We expect that this function will need to be revised in response to improved understanding of goal activation patterns.
Also, it is important to highlight that the time subscript on the weight in Equation 1 indicates that the relationship among goals in the hierarchy may change over time. As stated, the second aspect of spreading activation in MAT reflects the change in the activation level of a goal as a function of the magnitude of the perceived discrepancy. As discrepancies are reduced through actions, goallevel revision, or environmental changes, the activation level of the goal decreases. The opposite effect also occurs: As discrepancies increase, so too does the activation level of the goal. The function for a change in the activation level of a goal is adapted from Atkinson and Birch (1970) and may be represented as
where the goal activation levels are defined as previously and d is the signed magnitude of the discrepancy at time t. This function describes the exponential change in the goal activation level as a function of either an increase or decrease in the discrepancy associated with the goal. As a starting point, it is assumed that the change in activation is symmetric for discrepancy increases and decreases, but this will likely need to be amended as the theory develops. Considered together, these two activation functions may be combined to yield the overall goal activation level as a function of previous activation levels, changes in discrepancies, and changes in activation level as a result of relations with other goal activation levels. Combining the activation functions represented in Equation 1 and Equation 2 yields,
This conceptualization of goal activation highlights that any action taken to reduce a discrepancy on a particular goal can also simultaneously reduce discrepancies on multiple higher level goals. Similarly, many different actions can serve to reduce discrepancies associated with a particular higher order goal (Lewin, 1936; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) . This perspective may be stated formally as follows:
The activation level of goal (ij) at time t ϩ 1 is an exponential function of the perceived discrepancy between the current state and the goal state and the weighted linear composite of the activation levels of all goals connected to goal (ij) in the goal hierarchy.
In addition to considering the manner in which activation levels in the goal hierarchy change over time, it is equally important to consider factors that are omitted from Equation 3. Specifically, the absence of a decay parameter in the activation function (Equation 3) represents an important theoretical issue. Unlike activation functions used in learning and memory research, there is no decay parameter associated with the activation of a goal in MAT. This reflects the theoretical positions espoused by Freud (1915 Freud ( /1949 and Lewin (1936) that once a goal receives activation it will persist in the current level of activation until it is acted on by some force that either increases or decreases the perceived discrepancy between the current state and the goal state on either the focal goal or on goals related to the focal goal. Research on rumination and the persistence of thought focused on uncompleted goals provides convincing support for this perspective (Bargh & Barndollar, 1996; Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Zeigarnik, 1927) . This effect is particularly strong for goals central to the self (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996 ; L. L. Martin & Tesser, 1996; McIntosh & Martin, 1992) .
Conjecture 8. Goal activation does not spontaneously decay.
In the absence of perceived discrepancy reduction on goal (ij) or perceived discrepancy reduction on goals connected to goal (ij) , there is no change in the activation level of goal (ij) .
Action Selection
The current pattern of goal activations, along with the connections among the goals, results in some goals being more active than others. The goal with the highest activation level captures attention, and actions are taken to reduce discrepancies on this goal. Pursuit of the activated goal continues until the activation level of other, competing goals becomes higher either through the effective reduction of the discrepancy on the current goal or environmental changes that increase the activation of competing goals. In other words, action selection in MAT is a natural outcome of the patterns of goal activation, and conscious choice among competing actions is not required to guide the majority of behavior. This is consistent with Bargh and Chartrand's (1999) argument that the vast majority of behavior cannot possibly result from conscious choice processes.
Conjecture 9. At any fixed time point, action is directed toward reducing the perceived discrepancy on the goal with the highest activation level.
It is important to highlight that this action selection mechanism is much more flexible than traditional models of goal pursuit. The test-operate-test-exit (TOTE) cycle proposed by G. A. Miller et al. (1960) remains the dominant approach to action selection. In the TOTE cycle approach to action selection, a goal is tested to see whether it has been achieved and, if not, an action is performed to achieve the goal; this cycle of test-operate is repeated until the goal is eventually achieved or abandoned. At this point, a new goal is identified and a new TOTE cycle is enacted until this goal is achieved or abandoned. Unlike the MAT approach to action selection, a TOTE cycle approach does not allow for partial discrepancy reduction on multiple goals. In MAT discrepancy reduction results in decreased goal activation, and, as the activation level decreases, the probability that a competing goal will have a higher level of activation increases. So actions that reduce discrepancies on one or more goals increase the probability that other goals will capture attention and that new actions will be selected to reduce discrepancies on one or more different goals that have higher levels of activation.
Although MAT uses a different process to implement action selection, there is substantial overlap with expectancy theories of behavioral choice. Expectancy theory (e.g., Atkinson, 1958; Vroom, 1964) appears to have fallen out of favor, and the amount of new research either evaluating or using this choice model has dropped off precipitously since the zenith of its popularity in the 1970s and 1980s. This is a highly unfortunate result of numerous difficulties with measurement (Ilgen, Nebeker, & Pritchard, 1981) , research design (Mitchell, 1974) , and theoretical limitations (e.g., R. G. Lord & Maher, 1990) . However, it is clear that individuals must select among possible actions to accomplish goals, and the most reasonable choice is to pursue valued goals using actions that have the highest probability of goal accomplishment. Any theory of action must account for this basic necessity of action selection.
MAT, along with other goal hierarchy models of behavior, has the potential to subsume expectancy models of decision making. In MAT, the activation of goals determines their current importance. Active goals capture attention, and actions are undertaken to reduce discrepancies on these goals. However, which action should be selected? The weights connecting higher level goals with lower level means or actions reflect the likelihood that a given action will reduce discrepancies on the active goal. In other words, the weights connecting lower goals to higher goals can be thought of as expectancies. If a person has an activated high-level goal (valence), they will most likely choose actions that have the highest connection (expectancy; probability of meeting the goal) to the higher level goal. R. G. Lord, Hanges, and Godfrey (2003) provide a similar perspective on this issue, although the mechanism they propose differs.
Conjecture 10. The action with the largest weighted linkage (expectancy) to the most activated higher level goal will be enacted to reduce the perceived discrepancy on the goal.
Person ϫ Situation Dynamics
Personality and motivational researchers invest substantial effort to understand individual differences that are assumed to be stable across time and situations (i.e., traits). As such, the dynamics of behavior and the influence of situational factors on behavior have received relatively little attention (Funder, 2001; Mischel, Shoda, & Mendoza-Denton, 2002) . Instead, situations are often considered to represent noise or error that masks individual differences in personality. The predictable result of this perspective is that personality variables are rarely able to predict individual differences in behavior to any substantial extent (Funder, 2001; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001; Ross & Nisbett, 1991) . Instead, to understand, influence, or predict behavior, it is critical to understand the dynamic interplay of the individual as he or she encounters situations over time (Lewin, 1935) . The same objective situation may be perceived very differently depending on the motivational structures possessed by different individuals or the same individual at different times (C. G. Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979; Ross, 1990; Simon, 1994 ). An individual possessing a highly active failure-avoidance goal might react to a situation as a threat and engage in avoidance-oriented actions, whereas another individual possessing a highly activated mastery goal might perceive the same objective situation as an opportunity and engage in strong approach actions. The key point is that to understand action it is not enough to understand the person or the situation. To understand an individual's actions, it is necessary to understand how the person's goal structure affects the perception of the situation and how this perception further activates goals that result in actions.
Currently, the best available model of situated behavior is Mischel and Shoda's (1995) cognitive-affective personality system (CAPS). In this model, situational features activate a stable set of cognitive and affective representations based on the individual's prior experience with those features. The personality system is conceived as consisting of a large repertoire of "if-then" relations. If the situation activates a particular set of "ifs," a resulting set of behavioral "thens" are produced. The CAPS model overlaps substantially with J. R. Anderson's production models of memory consisting of many if-then relations. When the features of the situation meet the conditions of the production, then the associated behavior is "fired." When the ifs presented in the situation change, so too do the thens generated by the CAPS model even though the if-then relations remain the same.
The approach to situations adopted in MAT is somewhat different and is based on the theory of structural alignment in similarity research (Goldstone, 1994; Markman & Gentner, 1993) . In this approach to situations, there is a dynamic interplay between the goals that currently have the highest activation levels and situational features. The currently active goals affect the perception of the situation, and the features present in the situation result in increased activation for goals that are relevant to the situational features in a reciprocal fashion. So, for instance, Pickett, Gardner, and Knowles (2004) have shown that individuals with a highly activated affiliation goal are particularly sensitive to social cues. Conversely, it is now widely recognized that numerous features in the situation capture attention irrespective of currently activated goals (e.g., Franconeri, Simons, & Junge, 2004) . In the similarity literature, this iterative process has been shown to operate very quickly using parallel processing until the internal representations and the external situational features are brought into alignment. The computational model developed by Goldstone (1994) provides a mechanism for modeling the interaction of the person and situation.
Conjecture 11a. The perception of situational features, at a given point in time, is biased toward currently active goals.
Conjecture 11b. Perceived features in the situation affect the activation levels of goals by altering perceived current stategoal state discrepancies.
The treatment of the impact of the situation on behavior in MAT has many similarities to Mischel and Shoda's CAPS model of situated behavior. In their model, the individual has a series of if-then productions akin to J. R. Anderson's ACT-R production model of memory. This system, embodied in a computational model, makes it possible for different individuals to perceive the same situation in different ways and to "fire" different behaviors as a result. There is, however, a crucial difference between Mischel and Shoda's CAPS model and MAT regarding the effect of the situation on behavior. Because Mischel and Shoda (1995) rely on productions to model the effect of the situation on behavior, the same situation should always be perceived the same way by a particular person and, as a result, the same behavior should "fire" each time. This is not meant to imply that production models are completely inflexible. Productions may be modified over time, but the changes are relatively slow and so over long time spans situations may be perceived differently, and different behaviors may result. In contrast, the activation model underlying MAT provides a mechanism by which the same situation may be perceived differently from time to time depending on the activity level of the system goals when the situation is encountered. This does not imply that behavior will be completely inconsistent each time the same situation is encountered. Individuals tend to have chronically active goals, and so similar patterns of goal activation will likely be salient each time the individual encounters the situation.
Implications for Goal Orientation Research
MAT provides numerous improvements in the conceptualization of goal orientation. According to MAT, actions are undertaken to reduce discrepancies on currently active goals. The pattern of goal activation in the goal hierarchy (valences), coupled with the linkages connecting higher order goals with lower order goals (expectancies), yields appropriate actions for a given situation. The current pattern of goal activation interacts dynamically with situational features to yield new patterns of goal activation. We now examine the inconsistencies identified in our review of the goal orientation literature from the perspective of MAT and highlight the improved understanding of goal-oriented actions that results from adopting the perspective of MAT. We then discuss research implications of MAT that have not been addressed in the goal orientation literature.
Definition of Goal Orientation
As highlighted previously, numerous inconsistent definitions of goal orientation currently exist in the literature. This makes it challenging to compare the existing definition of goal orientation to the definition derived from MAT. It seems reasonable, however, to compare the definition derived from MAT with the current definition used by one of the construct originators. According to Dweck (1996, p. 69) , "implicit theories [people's basic assumptions about themselves and their world] create a meaning system or conceptual framework that influences which goals are salient and important to the individual." The bracketed information comes from the definition of implicit theories provided in an earlier section of the same study. Dweck continues the description of goal orientation as Essentially, it is proposed that a belief in a fixed trait orients an individual toward the goal of measuring, judging, or evaluating the trait. That is, when one holds an entity theory, the way one strives to know oneself and others is by diagnosing people's fixed attributes. In contrast, a belief in a more dynamic, malleable attribute-one that can be cultivated and changed-is proposed to orient the individual toward the goals of developing that attribute and of understanding the dynamics behind behavior in that domain. (p. 69) From this description, it is relatively clear that the beliefs held by individuals concerning the malleability of a trait (i.e., intelligence) result in the activation of different goals. The individual is then oriented toward actions that are consistent with the goal made salient or activated by the belief. This approach to goal orientation leaves a number of questions unanswered. What goals are activated by the beliefs? How do the beliefs activate goals? How does the situation affect either goals or beliefs? Is everything about a person's actions in a given achievement situation determined by the simple belief in the malleability of a personal characteristic?
Another highly influential perspective on goal orientation is found in Elliot's work (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2001 ). Elliot et al. approach goal orientation from the broader perspective of achievement motivation. In this model, achievement goals result from the achievement motives of need for achievement and fear of failure. Achievement motives are defined as "domain specific motivational tendencies that energize competence-relevant behavior and orient individuals toward positive or negative possibilities" (Elliot & Church, 2003, p. 372) . In this model, goal orientation is viewed as the effect of achievement goals on behavior such that Achievement goals are conceptualized as concrete cognitive representations that focus on a particular type of competence. Elliot and colleagues' Elliot & Harackiewicz, 1996) trichotomous achievement goal framework posits two forms of approach goals: mastery goals directed toward the attachment of task mastery and improvement, and performance-approach goals directed toward the attainment of normative competence. Performance avoidance goals are avoidance goals directed toward eluding normative incompetence. . .Achievement goals are presumed to represent an important motivational pathway through which cognitive strategies exert their influence on achievement-relevant outcomes. (Elliot & Church, 2003, p. 373) MAT provides a different perspective on goal orientation and achievement motivation. Viewed from the perspective of MAT, the term goal orientation is a misnomer. Individuals are not oriented toward different goals; instead, they pursue particular achievement goals and the resulting pattern of cognition and action is labeled goal orientation. To be precise, we define goal orientation as, Definition 1. Goal orientation is a label used to describe the pattern of cognition and action that results from pursuing a mastery-approach, performance-approach, or performance-avoid goal at a particular point in time in a specific achievement situation.
The pattern of goal activation resulting from the dynamic interplay of the person (current goal activations) and the situation (goal relevant, salient features) is coupled with the linkages (expectancies, beliefs, or implicit theories) connecting higher level goals to lower level goals, yielding a pattern of coherent behavior directed toward achieving the activated goals. As the individual's behavior alters perceived goal discrepancies, different achievement goals may become more active, resulting in a different pattern of coherent, goal-directed actions. Using goal orientation terminology, the person's goal orientation may switch over time, even in the same achievement context, in response to changes in the pattern of goal activation or changes in the situation.
There is necessarily substantial overlap in the definition of goal orientation derived from MAT with existing definitions of the construct. All of these perspectives highlight the importance of goals in determining actions. However, the definition of goal orientation derived from MAT goes beyond the existing perspectives in many important ways. First, MAT integrates the belief (implicit theories) aspect of Dweck's definition with Elliot's perspective on the importance of hierarchical goal structures. Second, MAT provides explicit goal content along with a processing structure that explains how goal-oriented actions result from the dynamic interplay of the person and the situation. Third, the spreading activation mechanism in MAT highlights that a person may switch goal orientations many times over the course of working on a task and, therefore, provides a dynamic model of goal-oriented actions. Finally, Elliot's perspective focuses exclusively on the development or demonstration of competence as the higher level goal. The goal hierarchy in MAT incorporates competence but also incorporates a much broader range of higher level goals known to affect action in achievement contexts.
Stability
The issue of whether goal orientation is a trait, quasi-trait, or state has been one of the most vexing problems in the goal orientation literature. Rather than face the issue head on, researchers appear to operationalize the construct in whatever manner is convenient for the adopted research methodology and then provide a passing acknowledgment that other perspectives exist. This practice, coupled with the dimensionality issue discussed next, is responsible for a great deal of the ambiguity now present in the literature. So, is goal orientation a trait or a state? Is it stable over situations and domains, or is it situation and domain specific? Is it stable over time within the same situation (e.g., a team meeting)?
From the perspective of MAT, the answer to these questions is a qualified "it depends." Specifically, it depends on the breadth of inference that the researcher is attempting to support. If the researcher is interested in predicting or understanding an individual's behavior at a particular time in a particular context, goaloriented behavior is most appropriately treated as a situationally specific state that is unstable over time. In other words, the individual's behavior is directed toward reducing discrepancies on the goals that currently have high activation levels using actions that have the highest expectancy for achieving the active goals in the particular situation. For this inferential focus, goal-oriented behavior falls at the extremely unstable end of the state-trait dimension.
However, it is also clear that very general self-report measures of dispositional goal orientation are able to provide small to moderate predictions of behavior across time and situations. This perspective, with a focus on broad inferences across time and situations, may also be understood through the functioning of goal activation in MAT. The activation of goals can be thought of in terms of chronic and transient accessibility. Goals that are frequently stimulated or activated become highly accessible and, therefore, are chronically ready to be activated (Bargh, 1999; Bargh & Thein, 1985) . Goals that are chronically activated influence behavior across time and situations. Transient accessibility of goals, in contrast, results from environmental cuing of specific goals. In this case, goals that are typically not activated become activated through unique aspects of a situation. These goals have temporarily heightened levels of activation until something changes either as a function of the person reducing discrepancies or a change in the situation. In general, transient goals that have been recently activated through the dynamic interaction of the person's goals with the features of the situation are more easily activated in subsequent situations (Higgins, 1996) . Similar processes have been found to operate in many different domains such as knowledge accessibility (Higgins, 1989b) , attitude accessibility (Fazio, 1995) , and person categorization (Srull & Wyer, 1979) . Of course, the activation levels associated with goals are continuous, and so there is no clear point at which a goal becomes chronically accessible.
Although not directly focused on goal activation, Fleeson (2001) provides data highly consistent with this perspective. Through the use of experience sampling methods, Fleeson demonstrated that individuals reported manifesting nearly all levels of all Big Five personality traits in everyday behavior. In other words, withinperson variability in reported personality-relevant behavior was very high on a daily basis. However, the central tendency of the behavioral distributions was highly stable across individuals. From this perspective, traits are the result of average state-oriented behavior. Therefore, if a researcher is only interested in relatively stable individual differences and is not concerned about the high levels of within-person variability in the expression of states over situations and time, then a dispositional approach to goal orientation is appropriate. To be clear, we define Definition 2. Dispositional goal orientation as a label used to describe the stable pattern of cognition and action that results from the chronic pursuit of a mastery-approach, performanceapproach, or performance-avoid goal in different situations over time.
The domain-specific approach advocated by Duda and Nicholls (1992) and VandeWalle (1997) falls somewhere between these two extremes and is highly appropriate depending on the inferential goals of the research. The vocational choice literature clearly highlights that individuals believe they have different aptitudes that are more or less important for different vocations (e.g., Betz & Hackett, 1981; Hackett, 1985) , and vocational choice is highly influenced by these beliefs. In goal orientation terminology, individuals often hold entity beliefs (expectancies) about their skills in various achievement domains and, therefore, adopt different achievement goals and enact different behaviors in the different domains. If the researcher is willing to limit inference concerning behavior to a particular achievement domain, then the withinperson variability will be reduced to some extent and prediction of behavior should be higher.
Definition 3. Domain-specific goal orientation is a label used to describe the pattern of cognition and action that results from the chronic pursuit of a mastery-approach, performanceapproach, or performance-avoid goal over time in a specific domain of achievement (e.g., work, academics, or sports).
Dimensionality
As discussed previously, we believe that current theory and data best support the three achievement goals suggested by Elliot and Church (1997) and VandeWalle (1997) : mastery-approach, performance-approach, and performance-avoid. Goal-oriented behavior is best thought of as clusters of behavior targeted at meeting one of these goals at a given point in time. In addition, it must be recognized that individuals may switch back and forth between the goals over time. At this point, we do not feel that incorporating the mastery-avoid goal is supported by existing data, and it is likely of limited practical utility. However, although we currently endorse a three-facet approach to goal strivings in achievement contexts, we expect that this perspective will need to be elaborated as more data are collected and inconsistencies identified.
Profiles
In MAT, behavior is enacted to accomplish a single goal. In so doing, the action may conveniently accomplish other goals and, if successful, the results of the action should cascade up the goal hierarchy and reduce discrepancies on many sequentially higher goals. However, the focus of an action, at any given time, is on a single goal. As discussed previously, any other model of goal pursuit would result in chaotic action, and goal accomplishment would be virtually impossible. The implication of this perspective is that at any one point in time a person is pursuing only a single achievement goal and can be portrayed as mastery oriented or performance-approach oriented or performance-avoid oriented. However, over a period of time, a person may switch between the various achievement goals and perform sequential actions designed to reduce discrepancies on more than one higher level goal. The proportion of time, over a fixed period, spent in pursuit of a particular achievement goal can be used to represent a profile of achievement goal pursuits. Thus, a person may flip back and forth between a performance-approach achievement goal and a masteryachievement goal many times over the course of working on a task. The task-switching literature provides clear limitations on the individual's ability to switch between goals and the costs associated with task switching (e.g., Monsell & Driver, 2000) . Only a person who focuses exclusively on a single achievement goal for the entire period of time relevant to the research may be typified as having a single orientation (e.g., mastery-oriented individuals). In any other case, the appropriate portrayal of a person's goal pursuits must reflect the proportion of time spent pursuing the different achievement goals.
Conjecture 12.
A profile approach to modeling goal-oriented action will provide incremental understanding of the consequences of adopting a particular achievement goal and switching between achievement goals beyond the level of predictability achieved using standard achievement goal orientation analyses.
Research Design: To Measure or Manipulate?
Is it best to measure or manipulate goal orientation? Again, using the MAT perspective, the most appropriate answer to this question is that it depends on the desired inference. If the researcher is interested in aspects of the situation that lead to the adoption of a particular achievement goal or in the outcomes of pursuing a particular achievement goal, then manipulating the factors that affect goal adoption is warranted. In this case, MAT provides insights into the functioning of manipulations that can be used to affect the goals adopted by individuals. The situational features that should impact the adoption of achievement goals are those that are most closely aligned with threats and opportunities to the self (i.e., agency, esteem, or affiliation) or those that should prime the principle goals. The former should work because of the communality and importance of these goals across individuals. The latter should be effective influences on goal adoption because of their close proximity to achievement goals.
If the research focus is on the consequences of achievement goal adoption, then the strength of linkages between the higher goals and the achievement goals may be manipulated to limit choice. Recall that the linkages between the goals across different levels capture the concept of expectancy: the likelihood that a particular action will result in the desired outcome. Increasing the expectancy connecting a desired outcome with an achievement goal will increase the probability that the achievement goal will be adopted and vice versa. An excellent example of this manipulation is found in the entity versus incremental manipulations. Expectancies are the basic mechanism through which this manipulation has its effects. If a credible source informs you that you cannot improve yourself or control your outcomes in a particular domain, then the expectancy for accomplishing this desired outcome is diminished. As a result, other achievement goals, with higher expectancies for obtaining other higher level goals, will be adopted. Finally, a very powerful manipulation of achievement goal adoption, and hence goal orientation, could couple a goal-priming manipulation with an expectancy manipulation.
If the researcher is interested in the natural functioning of individuals in achievement situations or in individual differences in the propensity to adopt a particular achievement goal, then measurement is the most appropriate operationalization of goal orientation. In this case, the primary decision is whether the achievement goals will be treated as states and the goal orientation process will be examined within persons over time and situations or whether goal orientation will be treated as a stable individual difference and the average use of chronically accessible achievement goals will be used to represent individual dispositions. If the intraperson dynamics of achievement goal functioning across time and situations are the research focus, then an extreme state approach to measurement is required. An excellent measurement strategy for this approach would be to use experience sampling techniques coupled with Vallacher and Wegner's (1987) approach of having participants report "what they are doing" at different time points across the observation period. A less precise but perhaps more practical approach would be to have participants provide one or more retrospective reports on the specific achievement goals pursued over the course of task performance.
If individual differences in the pursuit of achievement goals across time, situation, or both are the focus of research, then two measurement approaches seem reasonable. The most informative approach would be to follow Fleeson's (2001) lead and use aggregates of repeated reports of achievement goal pursuit based on experience sampling methods. This would allow the researcher to provide data on individual differences and within-person variability. A more practical and less useful approach is to rely on self-reports of typical achievement goal pursuit across situations and time. This measurement procedure is most similar to the self-report measures currently used but would focus less on assessing antecedents and consequences of goal-oriented behavior and more on the pursuit of specific achievement goals across time and contexts. Again, a domain-specific measurement approach would focus on individual differences in achievement goal pursuit that are stable across time but expected to be variable across situations or domains. In sum, depending on the research purpose, it is completely reasonable to either manipulate aspects of the situation to affect an individual's goal orientation or to measure an individual's goal orientation over a specified period of time. The key point made here is that the operationalization decision should be clearly based on a rationale evaluation of the research purpose in terms of a specified model of goal orientation.
New Directions for Goal Orientation Research

Achievement Goals, Goal Difficulty, and Goal Specificity
The MAT perspective of goal orientation espoused previously highlights that behaviors in achievement contexts, collectively labeled as goal orientation, reflect the pursuit of achievement goals over time. Other than the specific content of these goals and perhaps the level of the goals in a goal hierarchy, there is no reason to believe that there is anything out of the ordinary or special about these achievement goals. They function just like any other goal an individual strives to obtain. Given this, it is important to consider the integration of the substantial literature on goal setting with our MAT perspective on the pursuit of achievement goals. In this context, we are much more interested in self-set goals than the more common focus on assigned goals in the goal-setting literature. However, because assigned goals have their effect on performance through self-set goals, the basic findings in this literature hold for both self-set and assigned goals (e.g., Locke & Latham, 1990 , 2002 .
What are the implications of goal-setting theory for the study of goal-oriented behavior? One very important point of overlap is the concept of goal level or goal difficulty. Goal pursuits are not binary decisions in which the individual either does or does not strive for the goal. Instead, there are both intra-and interpersonal differences in the difficulty levels and the specificity of the goals that individuals strive to achieve. Thus, one person might adopt a performance-approach goal and be content if his or her performance falls above the majority of people performing the task. The same person at a different point in time or an entirely different person might also adopt a performance-approach goal in the same achievement context but strive to outperform 90% of the individuals working on the same task. This information is important because the goal-setting literature has clearly demonstrated that individuals who set more challenging and specific goals are likely to invest greater effort, persist longer in pursuing the goal, and achieve higher levels of performance with respect to the goal being pursued.
This means that to understand and predict an individual's goaloriented behavior in an achievement context, it is important to understand the goal being pursued, the difficulty level of the goal being pursued, and the specificity of the goal being pursued. This information would make it possible to distinguish individuals not only with respect to the types of behavior enacted but also in terms of the intensity and persistence of effort exerted to achieve the desired goal. When researching goal-oriented behavior, we recommend that individuals' achievement goals be assessed along with the difficulty and specificity of the adopted goal.
When assessing goal difficulty and goal specificity, it is important to recognize that the referent for evaluating performance relative to the goal being pursued has been found to differ across the achievement goals (e.g., Dweck, 1989) . Individuals pursuing performance-approach and performance-avoid goals are likely to use a normative standard when evaluating performance, whereas those pursuing mastery goals are more likely to use self-referenced performance or indexes of domain mastery (e.g., understanding a challenging genetics book) when evaluating performance. As an example of this issue, consider the research conducted by Seijts, Latham, Tasa, and Latham (2004) . Although the authors did specifically intend to manipulate goal orientation, this is one of the only studies in existence that has investigated issues of assigning goal levels (difficulty) on performance and learning goals. In this study, individuals were assigned a performance goal ("Your goal as the new CEO is to achieve 21% or more total market share by the end of the simulation") or a learning goal ("Past users of the simulation have shown that a goal of identifying and implementing six different strategies by the end of the simulation is difficult, yet attainable; thus, your goal as the new CEO is to identify and implement six or more strategies to achieve market share by the end of the simulation"). This example highlights two important issues. First, the assigned learning goal is referenced to normative performance and is, therefore, inconsistent with the self-referenced evaluations used by individuals pursuing mastery goals. The impact of using this reference when assigning a mastery goal is unclear, but it likely makes the normative aspects of the task salient and pushes individuals toward the adoption of performance goals instead of mastery goals. To the best of our knowledge, Harackiewicz and Elliot (1998) provide the only existing example of simultaneously manipulating mastery and performance goals and performance levels in a manner consistent with the appropriate performance reference (i.e., normative vs. self-referenced). Second, the difference in the referential focus of mastery and performance goals (self vs. other) makes the comparison of goal difficulty across the different achievement goals very challenging. So, for instance, in the Seijts et al. (2004) research, it is impossible to know whether the assigned standards for the learning and performance goals were of equal difficulty; therefore, comparing the performance of these groups provides only limited information on the efficacy of the manipulation. Mitchell and James (2001) emphasized that most theories of human behavior and empirical investigations of these theories fail to consider the dynamics of behavior over time. They provided cogent arguments concerning the likelihood of inferential errors when time is not explicitly incorporated into behavior theory and investigations and succinctly stated that At the simplest level, in examining whether an X causes a Y, we need to know when X occurs and when Y occurs. More complex relationships may involve repeated incidents of X or Y or predicted changes in either X or Y, or both. Without theoretical or empirical guides about when to measure X and Y, we run the risk of inappropriate measurement, analysis, and ultimately, inferences about the strength, order, and direction of causal relationships. (p. 530) Thus, perhaps the most important contribution of MAT to the study of goal orientation is the explicit incorporation of the dynamics of goal-oriented behavior over time and situations based on the goal activation conceptualization.
Time Course of Goal-Oriented Actions
Goal Orientation and Action Identification
The intersection of goal orientation research and research on action identification levels provides another fruitful area for future investigations. Wegner (1985, 1989) have demonstrated that individuals vary, sometimes substantially, in their identification of actions. In other words, if you ask people what they are doing at a given point in time, some individuals tend to provide high-level, abstract identifications (e.g., improving my presentation skills), whereas others tend to provide concrete action identifications that represent actions much lower in the hierarchy (e.g., listening to the trainer). There is every reason to believe that this process operates similarly for achievement goal strivings. If so, coupling MAT with action identification theory results in a number of interesting research predictions. For instance, individuals who identify goal-oriented actions at lower levels in the goal hierarchy should be more distractible and more likely to switch the pursuit of achievement goals over time in response to situational changes. This implies that individuals with lower level action identifications should be less likely to persist in the pursuit of a goal when difficulties are encountered. Similarly, based on the notion of situational malleability of goal pursuits, individuals using low-level action identities should be more influenced by the social nature of many tasks and, therefore, more likely to use normative performance as a reference and adopt performance-approach and performance-avoid achievement goals. If these predictions hold true, then the factors that affect action identifications could prove to be potent levers for influencing the adoption and pursuit of achievement goals.
Practical Implications of the MAT Perspective
The practical recommendations that we derive from MAT differ from those existing in the current goal orientation literature in a number of ways. First, MAT highlights that each individual likely has distinct patterns of higher order goal activations that interact with situational features to determine achievement goal pursuits at a particular point in time. This dynamic Person ϫ Situation interaction model strongly suggests that the typical, one-size-fits-all approach to managing human resources cannot be the optimal way to interact with and motivate organizational members. Depending on the relative activation (both temporary and chronic activation) of an individual's higher level goals, one individual might view a 360-degree feedback process as highly informative and useful, whereas another might view the same system as a strong threat to self-esteem or affiliation. In other words, the same human resource process can result in very different behavioral outcomes depending on the pattern of goal activation within the person. Tailored human resource practices designed to heighten motivation are certainly not a new idea. The fact that tailoring human resource practices to individual differences in goal strivings or personality facets has not gained widespread acceptance and use suggests that organizational decision makers are currently content to motivate the average employee to a moderate extent. As the pace of change in organizations increases and the need for developing an adaptable, highly motivated workforce increases, we believe there will necessarily be a shift toward more optimal tailored systems. We now highlight three more important practical implications of the MAT approach to achievement goal strivings.
Performance Versus Effectiveness
The typical treatment of performance in goal orientation research is often simplistic. Button et al. (1996) originally emphasized that mastery orientation is generally a desirable focus for individual development and growth that presumably would result in future improvements in performance. However, at any given time point, an individual may need to focus attention on performing a task rather than continuing to explore the task, and so a performance orientation may be desirable. The ensuing organizational goal orientation literature seems to have ignored this perspective and has almost uniformly endorsed the perspective that individuals' mastery orientation should be enhanced. Some have gone so far as to recommend that individuals be selected into organizations based on their mastery orientation (e.g., VandeWalle et al., 2000) . Consistent with Mitchell and James's (2001) critique of most organizational research, this perspective fails to consider or evaluate the dynamics of performance over time.
In contrast, the dynamics inherent in the MAT perspective of goal-oriented behavior highlight that organizational decision makers should focus on effectiveness rather than one-shot indexes of performance. We use the term effectiveness to refer to the multidimensional nature of performance over time (e.g., Hackman, 1990) . The concept of effectiveness is related to economic perspective of capital, which refers to resources withheld from immediate consumption in the expectation of greater future returns (Drucker, 1985, p. 27) . In this context, the relevant resource is human capital (Czikszentmihalyi, 2003) . Czikszentmihalyi suggests that capital is built up through activities that stimulate increased complexity within a person (which he conceptualizes as differentiation and integration) and consumed through activities that do not. As an example, consider a manufacturing team that has the highest quarterly production record but is incapable of high production in future quarters because the process has depleted the team members' ability to perform both individually and collectively in the future. This group performed well but is not considered effective (Czikszentmihalyi, 2003; Hackman, 1990) . Thus, by effective, we mean performing well and amassing psychological and social capital that supports and enhances future performance.
Employee Well-Being
MAT is fundamentally a model of intraperson goals that attempts to explain individual differences in achievement strivings as a function of individual differences in goal structures and situational influences on goal activation levels. From this perspective, it is interesting to note that the focus of virtually all practical recommendations in the organizational goal orientation literature is on improving organizational productivity. This focus is particularly surprising given the educational roots of goal orientation and the strong focus in that literature on structuring environments to optimize student learning and development for the sake of the students. In the organizational context, one must ask, "What happened to the focus on developing the employee?" Rare exceptions to this asymmetric treatment of the employee-employer relationship are mostly found in the excellent European research on employee well-being and emotion work (e.g., Sonnentag, 2001; Zapf, 2002; Zapf, Seifert, Schmutte, Mertini, & Holz, 2001 ), work-family conflict (Zedeck, 1992) , and occupational health research (Quick & Tetrick, 2003) .
The idea that organizations should play a role in promoting individual and collective employee well-being is not new (e.g., Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959; Maslow, 1965; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939) . In fact, Division 14 of the American Psychological Association changed its name from Industrial Psychology to Industrial-Organizational (I/O) psychology in part to recognize what Viteles (1944) described as "the growing concern of industrial psychologists with the sentiments, feelings, and attitudes of workers, supervisors, and managers, and with the interplay of people in the social organization of the industrial enterprise" (Highhouse, in press, p. 182) . However, as stated previously, goal orientation research in I/O psychology focuses almost entirely on the benefits accrued by the organization rather than on the outcomes for the person. This criticism is, of course, not unique to goal orientation research; I/O psychology has historically been criticized (both internally and externally) for valuing organizational effectiveness more than well-being (Blum, 1955) and, relatedly, for being interested in the latter only insofar as it relates to the former (Nord, 1977) .
From a short-term organizational perspective, an optimal achievement goal profile is one that complements the organization's strategy (i.e., the pattern or plan that integrates an organization's major goals, policies, and actions sequences into a cohesive whole; Quinn, 1980) . Strategies are important because they help the organization develop and maintain a competitive advantage by creating value in its production process (Porter, 1985) . Thus, an organization is likely to be most often interested in encouraging the adoption of a mastery goal when idea generation and product development are needed and a performance-approach goal when deadlines must be met. There is little reason to believe that an organization would ever benefit from having its members adopt performance-avoid goals.
Based on MAT, optimal outcomes for the individual occur when the person either perceives little discrepancy between desired and actual standing on desired higher level goals such as agency, affiliation, or esteem or at least perceives that he or she is making adequate progress toward reducing the perceived discrepancies. As reviewed previously, when the individual's standing on these fundamental human goals is threatened or progress toward these fundamental human goals is blocked, the individual will experience anxiety, worry, stress, and, in extreme cases, debilitating depression. Thus, from the employee perspective, the adoption of a performance-avoid goal and the use of behaviors to pursue this goal (e.g., self-handicapping, task disengagement, and off-task cognitions) can be highly productive insofar as it protects the individual's self-esteem, agency perceptions, or affiliation goals.
We are not suggesting that organizations should structure themselves to be enablers of individual goal pursuits. That particular utopian ideal has been tried, and it failed. Instead, we suggest that in most cases a situation may be structured in such a way that both the organization and the individual are able to make progress toward their respective goals. To illustrate this point, further consider the training context. Here, the context factors are relatively fixed: The desired state is learning, the amount of time allotted to achieve it is relatively lengthy, the length of time expected to maintain it is relatively short, and the cost per error is relatively low. Thus, in terms of organizational goals, the case for the adoption of a mastery goal (and thus the case for a mastery training context) is clear. However, from an individual's perspective, adopting a mastery goal in this context is only functional if learning the training content makes it possible to achieve higher level goals. The organization must be able to convince the employee that adopting a mastery goal in this context will result in improved standing on important goals more so than adopting a different achievement goal.
Climates for Effectiveness
A common recommendation in the organizational literature is to develop climates that promote mastery orientation (e.g., Brett & VandeWalle, 1999; Ford & Oswald, 2003; VandeWalle & Cummings, 1997) . At least two limitations are associated with this perspective. First, the overemphasis on creating a climate for mastery does not reflect organizational realities that frequently require employees to focus on performance instead of learning or growth. Second, current conceptualizations of goal orientation are not rich enough to provide guidance on the aspects of organizational practices that need to be modified to support an effective goal orientation climate. In contrast, MAT provides clear guidance on both these aspects of goal orientation climates. By focusing on effective performance over time, MAT highlights the dynamic interplay of switching back and forth between the various achievement goals in response to organizational realities. However, MAT further emphasizes that the short-term switches in achievement goals to meet organizational realities should not occur at the long-term expense of employee well-being and human capital. Furthermore, MAT provides clear guidance on the aspects of the organizational climate that need to be aligned with the goals of the individual to promote this process. Rather than focusing on creating a mastery orientation climate, we believe that organizations should cultivate environments that promote employee growth (e.g., career pathing), support fairness perceptions and trust, facilitate organizational processes and structures that specify clear paths to success and behavioral boundaries, and provide public rewards for effective behavior that demonstrate the social value of the em-ployee and the behaviors exhibited by the employee. By supporting the employee's strivings toward these higher order goals, the factors that lead employees to select nonoptimal goal pursuits, from the organization's perspective, will be reduced.
Conclusions
The title of this article is purposefully ambiguous. Is the focus on goal orientation as an achievement motivation construct or on goal-oriented behavior as a dynamic process that unfolds over time in achievement situations? Our primary point is that there is no difference between these two conceptualizations of action. Goal orientation refers to the clusters of actions undertaken in the pursuit of achievement goals in specific situations. As such, goal orientation is best viewed as a specific instantiation of more general models of self-regulation and action. In MAT, goaloriented behavior results from constantly shifting activation levels among competing goals that provides a mechanism for modeling behavior as a dynamic stream of choices (either conscious or unconscious) over time and situations.
The MAT perspective of goal orientation provides researchers with a great deal of flexibility in the methods used to investigate antecedents and consequences of adopting particular achievement goals (i.e., goal orientations). Manipulations that focus on enhancing or suppressing the salience of goals central to the self and manipulations that affect the expectancies connecting actions to the desired higher level goals are both excellent ways to study the antecedents and consequences of goal orientation. Measuring naturally occurring levels of achievement goal pursuit with a focus on inter-or intrapersonal differences can substantially improve our understanding of this critically important motivational process in both artificial and natural environments. However, the flexibility provided by MAT comes at a very real cost. It is the responsibility of the researcher to clearly identify the aspects of goal orientation under investigation and to clearly limit inference to the aspects of goal orientation actually investigated.
There are numerous boundary conditions for the model presented previously and even more unresolved questions. The MAT approach to goal orientation only addresses the pursuit of achievement goals in situations perceived by the individual as emphasizing achievement. Further, the MAT approach focuses on adult strivings once the individual's goal structure is already well established. The developmental history of this structure is not specified and is poorly understood. In addition to these boundary conditions, there are many unresolved issues that need to be incorporated into the MAT perspective of goal orientation. First, there is no reason why the goal hierarchy specified in Figure 1 should be the same for all individuals. The self goals are generally thought to be universal. The weights may differ, but every human is thought to pursue these fundamental goals. However, lower level goals become increasingly idiosyncratic, and at some point this could result in qualitatively different goal hierarchies. Second, the impact of affect and expected affect is not currently incorporated into the model. Affective outcomes of goal achievement or goal frustration are relatively straightforward. The differences in affective reactions to pursuit of approach and avoidance goals are also becoming increasingly clear. What is entirely unclear is how affect impacts subsequent goal activation, goal linkages, attention, and action selection in a dynamic process. Third, it is important to highlight that there is currently no central executive in MAT or, for that matter, in any hierarchical model of goal-oriented self-regulation. The functioning of goal activation and action selection in MAT has more in common with the automatic functioning of neural networks than conscious choice processes. The role of the executive in self-regulatory processes is currently not understood well enough to be integrated into a self-regulatory model. These three major limitations of MAT are just a sample of the many areas that need further research before self-regulatory models can become more complete explanations of behavior.
To conclude, it is worthwhile to highlight the conspicuous absence of empirical results in our literature review. After going through every empirical piece of research we could identify, we arrived at the conclusion that an accurate representation of the empirical literature would be so highly contingent on the methods used to study goal orientation that little useful information would actually be communicated. Even the generally accepted finding that high levels of mastery orientation result in adaptive behavior and positive outcomes and high levels of performance orientation result in maladaptive behavior and poor outcomes can no longer be clearly supported from an empirical perspective. It is our hope that MAT will provide a vehicle for future achievement motivation and goal orientation research to operate from a more conceptually grounded perspective so that the antecedents and consequences of this important motivational process may be clearly identified.
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